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In this paper we provide a semantic reconstruction of rational closure. We first consider
rational closure as defined by Lehman and Magidor [33] for propositional logic, and we
provide a semantic characterization based on a minimal models mechanism on rational
models. Then we extend the whole formalism and semantics to Description Logics, by
focusing our attention to the standard ALC: we first naturally adapt to Description Logics
Lehman and Magidor’s propositional rational closure, starting from an extension of ALC
with a typicality operator T that selects the most typical instances of a concept C (hence
T(C) stands for typical C). Then, for the Description Logics, we define a minimal model
semantics for the logic ALC and we show that it provides a semantic characterization for
the rational closure of a Knowledge base. We consider both the rational closure of the TBox
and the rational closure of the ABox.
 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
In [31] Kraus Lehmann and Magidor (henceforth KLM) proposed an axiomatic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning
based on the notion of plausible inference. Plausible inferences are represented by conditionals of the form A |∼ B , to be
read as “typically or normally A entails B”. For instance, the conditional assertion monday |∼ go_work can be used in order
to represent that “normally if it is Monday I go to work”. Conditional entailment is nonmonotonic since from A |∼ B one
cannot derive A ∧ C |∼ B , in our example from monday |∼ go_work one cannot monotonically derive monday ∧ ill |∼ go_work
(“normally if it is Monday, even if I am ill I go to work”).
KLM presented a hierarchy of axiomatic systems for plausible inference, each system specifies a set of postulates char-
acterizing plausible inference. The systems are, from the weakest to the strongest: cumulative logic C, loop-cumulative
logic CL, and most important preferential logic P. In subsequent work [33] preferential logic was strengthened to rational
logic R and the latter was proposed as the most adequate system to represent (nonmonotonic) plausible inference.
Although it is arguable whether, KLM systems, and in particular R, represent adequately all types of nonmonotonic
inferences,1 we think that KLM systems and the strongest R in particular, are still a significant proposal for nonmonotonic
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: laura.giordano@mfn.unipmn.it (L. Giordano), valentina.gliozzi@unito.it (V. Gliozzi), nicola.olivetti@univ-amu.fr (N. Olivetti),
gianluca.pozzato@unito.it (G.L. Pozzato).
1 It has been shown that existing nonmonotonic systems do not satisfy in general all the properties of KLM systems: in particular circumscription (for
well-founded theories) satisfies all postulates of preferential logic, but it does not satisfy rational monotony of R, whereas default logic fails to satisfy even
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reasoning for two reasons: (a) on a theoretical level, they define a set of inferential properties which are useful (even if not
necessarily wanted) to classify and analyze concrete nonmonotonic inference, (b) they provide a simple and direct language
to express plausible inferences and to reason about them.
In this work we take KLM logic R as the basis of our approach to nonmonotonic reasoning. Even if R formalizes some
properties of nonmonotonic inference it is too weak in itself to perform useful nonmonotonic inferences.
We have just seen that by the nonmonotonicity of |∼, A |∼ B does not entail A∧ C |∼ B (monday |∼ go_work does not entail
monday ∧ ill |∼ go_work), and this is a wanted property of |∼: it is what allows to express sets of conditionals that in classical
logic would lead to contradictory or absurd conclusions (for instance {monday→ go_work,monday ∧ ill→¬go_work} gives
¬(monday ∧ ill) in classical logic, that is that it is impossible to be ill on Monday). However, there are cases in which,
in the absence of information to the contrary, we would like to be able to tentatively infer that also A ∧ C |∼ B , with the
possibility of withdrawing the inference in case we discovered that it is inconsistent. or instance, we might want to infer
that A∧ C |∼ B when C is irrelevant with respect to the property B: in the example, we might want to tentatively infer from
monday |∼ go_work (“normally if it is Monday, I go to work”) that monday ∧ shines |∼ go_work (“normally if it is Monday,
even if the sun shines I go to work”), with the possibility of withdrawing the conclusion if we discovered that indeed the
sun shining prevents from going to work. R cannot handle irrelevant information in conditionals, and the inferences just
exemplified are not supported.
Partially motivated by this weakness, Lehmann and Magidor have proposed a true nonmonotonic mechanism on the
top of R. Rational closure [33] on the one hand preserves the properties of R, on the other hand it allows to perform
some truthful nonmonotonic inferences, like the one just mentioned (monday∧ shines |∼ go_work). In [33] the authors give a
syntactic procedure to calculate the set of conditionals entailed by the rational closure as well as a quite complex semantic
construction. It is worth noticing that a strongly related construction has been proposed by Pearl [38] with his notion of
1-entailment, originating from a probabilistic interpretation of conditionals within the well-established System Z.
In this paper we provide a semantic reconstruction of rational closure for propositional logic as well as for Description
Logics (DLs for short) with a specific attention to the standard ALC . We first consider rational closure as defined by Lehman
and Magidor [33] for propositional logic, and we provide a semantic characterization based on a minimal models mechanism
on rational models. Then we extend the whole formalism and semantics to Description Logics: we first naturally adapt to
DLs Lehman and Magidor’s propositional rational closure, starting from an extension of ALC with a typicality operator T
that selects the most typical instances of a concept C (the extension is called ALC + TR). For ALC + TR , we provide both
a syntactic and a semantical notion of rational closure, along the same lines used for the propositional case: we first define
rational closure over the TBox, and subsequently rational closure for the ABox.
The first problem we tackle in this work is that of giving a purely semantical characterization of the syntactic notion of
rational closure. Our semantic characterization has as its main ingredient the modal semantics of logic R, over which we
build a minimal models’ mechanism, based on the minimization of the rank of worlds. Intuitively, we prefer the models
that minimize the rank of domain elements: the lower the rank of a world, the more normal (or less exceptional) is
the world and our minimization corresponds intuitively to the idea of minimizing less-normal or less-plausible worlds
(or maximizing most plausible ones). We show that a semantic reconstruction of rational closure can be obtained as a
specific instance of a general semantic framework for nonmonotonic reasoning. Within this general framework we give
two characterizations of rational closure: one based on a fixed interpretations semantics and the other with a variable
interpretations semantics.
The theoretical question we address in this first part of the paper is the following:
A) Given the fact that logic R is characterized by a specific class of Kripke models, what are the Kripke models that
characterize the rational closure of a set of positive conditionals?
We notice in passim that our semantic characterization of rational closure in terms of minimal models is different from
the one given by Lehmann and Magidor’s in [33] which is based on a different notion of minimal models. Moreover we con-
sider our semantic characterization as a specific case of a general minimal models’ mechanism for nonmonotonic reasoning,
and in this paper we show under what conditions we capture rational closure. The generality of our semantical character-
ization is well-suited to study variants of rational closure. Finally, the semantic characterization does also easily extend to
other logics, as Description Logics (ALC), that we discuss next. In the second part of the paper we consider Description
Logics. If propositional KLM systems deal with propositions (“I go to work”) and relations among propositions (“usually,
if it is Monday, then I go to work”), Description Logics deal with concepts, relations among concepts, as well as with in-
dividuals. In Description Logics one can use concept inclusion in order to express that all the members of a class have
a given property (thus Cats ⊑ Mammal expresses the general property that “cats are mammals”, and Pet ⊑ ∃HasOwner.⊤
that “all pets have an owner”). One can also use assertions in order to represent the fact that an individual has a
given property, e.g. Cat(tom) (“Tom is a cat”) or ∃HasOwner.⊤(tom) (“Tom has an owner”) or HasOwner(tom,nadeem)
(“Nadeem is Tom’s owner”). A distinguishing quality of Description Logics is their controlled complexity: the trade-off be-
the cumulativity postulate of the weakest logic C. Of course, a nonmonotonic mechanism may give rise to different inference relations (skeptical, credulous,
etc.) with different properties.
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tween expressivity of the languages and good computational complexities is one of the main reasons justifying the success
of DLs.
Many works in the literature have considered how to extend the basic formalism of Description Logics with non-
monotonic reasoning features [1,2,8,12,13,23,32,30,5,37,40,21]; the purpose of these extensions is to allow to reason about
prototypical properties of individuals or classes of individuals. In these extensions one can represent, for instance, knowl-
edge expressing the fact that the heart is usually positioned in the left-hand side of the chest, with the exception of people
with situs inversus, that have the heart positioned in the right-hand side. Also, one can infer that an individual enjoys all
the typical properties of the classes it belongs to. So, for instance, in the absence of information that someone has situs
inversus, one would assume that it has the heart positioned in the left-hand side.
In spite of the number of work in this direction, the problem of extending DLs for reasoning about prototypical properties
seems far from being solved. The most well-known semantics for nonmonotonic reasoning have been used to the purpose,
from default logic [1], to circumscription [2], from Lifschitz’s nonmonotonic logic MKNF [12,37] to KLM logics. In particular,
concerning KLM logics, in [17] a preferential extension of ALC (called ALC + T) is defined, based on the KLM logic P, and
in [5] a defeasible description logic based on the KLM logic R is introduced. In [23] a minimal model semantics for the logic
ALC + T is presented.
An approach to the definition of rational closure for DLs has been proposed by Casini and Straccia in [8], where a notion
of rational closure is defined for ALC through an algorithmic construction similar to the one introduced by Freund in [14]
for the propositional calculus. For propositional logic, this construction can be proved to be equivalent to the notion of
rational closure proposed by Lehmann and Magidor in [33]. [8] explores the axiomatic properties of this notion of rational
closure for ALC , and shows that the notion of default assumption consequence is a rational consequence relation validating
the knowledge base. On the other hand, [8] does not consider a semantics for rational closure.
In this paper, we take our moves from the notion of propositional rational closure given by Lehmann and Magidor, and
we show that it can be naturally extended to the description logic ALC . Furthermore, we investigate its semantics, by
extending to ALC the minimal model semantics introduced at the propositional level in order to address question A. The
questions we address in the second part of the paper are therefore the following:
B) What is the natural extension of the well-established notion of rational closure in [33] to Description Logics?
C) What is the corresponding semantics?
D) How can this mechanism deal with the ABox?
As we will see, for concept inclusions (TBox) the extension of both the syntactic and the semantical characterization of
rational closure from propositional logic to DLs is relatively direct, although the presence of typicality assertions in the
ABox makes things not straightforward. Furthermore, the algorithmic construction we propose for ABox reasoning is novel
and it entirely relies on the semantical characterization: only once we have extended the semantics for rational closure to
take into account ABox individuals, we can provide the corresponding mechanism to compute rational closure of the ABox.
As matter of fact, we do not consider our adaption of Lehmann and Magidor’s rational closure to DLs as the conclusive
solution to the issue of nonmonotonic extensions of Description Logics. Rational closure has some known weaknesses that
come together with its recognized advantages (among which, its computational lightness, which is crucial in Description
Logics). Both advantages and weaknesses are inherited by its extension to Description Logics. Nevertheless, since rational
closure is one of the most established formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning and it has good computational properties,
we think that its application to Description Logics significantly contributes to the quest of nonmonotonic extensions of
Description Logics. Furthermore, this work can be regarded as a first step towards the exploration of semantics for more
refined versions of rational closure, that overcome some of the known weaknesses of this mechanism (see for instance
[9,11] which combines rational closure with inheritance networks).
To summarize the resulting approach: our starting point is the standard Description Logic ALC , more precisely ALC
extended with a typicality operator T. The operator T, first introduced in [17], allows to directly express typical properties
such as T(HeartPosition)⊑ Left, T(Bird)⊑ Fly, and T(Penguin)⊑¬Fly, whose intuitive meaning is that, normally, the heart is
positioned in the left-hand side of the chest, that typical birds fly, whereas penguins do not. In this paper, the T operator
is intended to enjoy the well-established properties of rational logic R. Even if T is a nonmonotonic operator (so that for
instance T(HeartPosition)⊑ Left does not entail that T(HeartPosition ⊓ SitusInversus)⊑ Left), the logic itself is monotonic. In-
deed, in this logic it is not possible to monotonically infer from T(Bird)⊑ Fly, in the absence of information to the contrary,
that also T(Bird ⊓ Black)⊑ Fly. Nor can it be nonmonotonically inferred from Bird(tweety), in the absence of information to
the contrary, that T(Bird)(tweety). Nonmonotonicity is achieved first by adapting to ALC with T the propositional construc-
tion of rational closure. This nonmonotonic extension allows to infer typical subsumptions from the TBox (TBox reasoning).
Intuitively and similarly to the propositional case, the rational closure construction amounts to assigning a rank (a level
of exceptionality) to every concept; this rank is used to evaluate typical inclusions of the form T(C) ⊑ D: the inclusion is
supported by the rational closure whenever the rank of C is strictly smaller than the rank of C ⊓¬D . From a semantic point
of view, nonmonotonicity is achieved by defining, on the top of ALC with typicality, a minimal model semantics which
is similar to the one in [23]. Differently from [23], the notion of minimality used here is based on the minimization of
the ranks of the domain elements, rather than on the minimization of the extension of specific concepts. This semantics
provides a characterization to the rational closure construction for ALC .
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Last, we tackle the problem of extending rational closure to ABox reasoning: in order to ascribe typical properties to
individuals, we maximize the typicality of an individual. This is done by minimizing its rank (that is, its level of exception-
ality). As we will see, because of the interaction between individuals (due to roles) it is not possible to separately assign
a unique minimal rank to each individual and alternative minimal ranks must be considered. We end up with a kind of
skeptical inference with respect to the ABox.
The rational closure construction we propose for ALC has not just a theoretical interest and a simple minimal model
semantics. We show that it retains the same complexity of the underlying description logic. For ALC , the problem of
deciding whether a typical inclusion belongs to the rational closure of the TBox is in ExpTime as well as the problem of
deciding whether an assertion C(a) belongs to the rational closure of the knowledge base over the ABox. In this respect, the
proposed approach is less complex than other approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in DLs such as [23,2] and comparable
in complexity with the approaches in [8,6,37], and thus a good candidate to define effective nonmonotonic extensions of
DLs. The results on the rational closure in ALC (as an extension of Lehmann and Magidor’s rational closure [33]) extensively
rely on the finite model property, which holds for ALC . However, the construction of rational closure can be extended to
more expressive description logics that do not enjoy the finite model property. Some preliminary results on the rational
closure for SHIQ [29] can be found in [26].
2. Propositional rational closure: a semantic characterization
2.1. KLM rational system R
The language of logic R consists just of conditional assertions A |∼ B . We here consider a richer language which also
allows boolean combinations of assertions. Our language L is defined from a set of propositional variables ATM, the boolean
connectives and the conditional operator |∼. From propositional variables, propositional formulas are defined as usual in
the propositional logic. We use A, B,C, . . . to denote propositional formulas (that do not contain conditional formulas),
whereas F ,G, . . . are used to denote all formulas (including conditionals). The formulas of L are defined as follows: if A is
a propositional formula, A ∈L; if A and B are propositional formulas, A |∼ B ∈L; if F is a boolean combination of formulas
of L, then F ∈L. A knowledge base K is a set of conditional assertions A |∼ B . In this work, we restrict our attention to finite
knowledge bases.
Before presenting the axiomatization of R, let us clarify one point: in its original presentation [33], a conditional A |∼ B is
considered as a consequence relation between a pair of propositional formulas A and B , so that their systems provide a set
of “postulates” (or closure conditions) that the intended consequence relation must satisfy. Alternatively, these postulates
may be seen as rules to derive new conditionals from given ones. We take a slightly different viewpoint, shared, among
others, by Halpern and Friedman [15] (see Section 8) and Boutilier [4], who proposed a modal interpretation of R: in
our understanding, this system is an ordinary logical system in which a conditional A |∼ B is a formula belonging to the
object language. Whenever we restrict our consideration, as done by Lehmann and Magidor in [33], to the entailment of a
conditional from a set of conditionals, the two viewpoints coincide, and a conditional is a logical consequence of a set of
conditionals in logic R if and only if it belongs to all rational consequence relations extending that set of conditionals, or
(in semantic terms), it is valid in all rational models (as defined by [33]) of that set.
Here is the axiomatization of logic R. In our presentation Lehmann and Magidor’s postulates/rules are just axioms. We
use ⊢PC (resp. |HPC) to denote provability (resp. validity) in the propositional calculus.
All axioms and rules of propositional logic (PC)
A |∼ A (REF)
if ⊢PC A↔ B then (A |∼ C)→ (B |∼ C) (LLE)
if ⊢PC A→ B then (C |∼ A)→ (C |∼ B) (RW)
((A |∼ B)∧ (A |∼ C))→ (A ∧ B |∼ C) (CM)
((A |∼ B)∧ (A |∼ C))→ (A |∼ B ∧ C) (AND)
((A |∼ C)∧ (B |∼ C))→ (A ∨ B |∼ C) (OR)
((A |∼ B)∧¬(A |∼¬C))→ (A ∧ C |∼ B) (RM)
The axiom (CM) is called cumulative monotony and it is characteristic of all KLM logics, axiom (RM) is called rational
monotony and it characterizes the logic of rational entailment R (it is what distinguishes rational from the weaker preferen-
tial entailment). In [15], Friedman and Halpern have shown that the axiom system of R is complete with respect to a wide
spectrum of different semantics (e.g. possibilistic structures and k-rankings), proposed in order to formalize some forms of
nonmonotonic reasoning. This can be explained by the fact that all these models are examples of plausibility structures, and
the truth in them is captured by the axioms of R.
The logic R enjoys a very simple modal semantics, actually it turns out that it corresponds to the flat fragment of
the well-known conditional logic VC [34]. The modal semantics is defined by considering a set of worlds W equipped
by an accessibility (or preference) relation <. Intuitively the meaning of x < y is that x is more typical/more normal/less
exceptional than y. We say that a conditional A |∼ B is true in a model if B holds in all most normal worlds where A is
true, i.e. in all <-minimal worlds satisfying A.
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Definition 1. A rational model is a triple
M= 〈W,<, V 〉
where:
• W is a non-empty set of worlds;
• < is an irreflexive, transitive relation on W satisfying modularity: for all x, y, z, if x < y then either x < z or z < y.
< further satisfies the Smoothness condition defined below;
• V is a function V :W 7−→ 2ATM , which assigns to every world w the set of atoms holding in that world. If F is a
boolean combination of formulas, its truth conditions (M, w |H F ) are defined as for propositional logic. Let A be a
propositional formula; we define MinM< (A)= {w ∈W |M,w |H A and ∀w
′ , w ′ < w implies M,w ′ 6|H A}. Moreover:
M,w |H A |∼ B
if for all w ′ , if w ′ ∈MinM< (A) then M,w
′ |H B .
At this point we can define the Smoothness condition: if M,w |H A, then either w ∈MinM< (A) or there is w
′ ∈MinM< (A)
such that w ′ < w .
Validity and satisfiability of a formula are defined as usual. We say that a formula F is satisfiable if there is a rational
model M = 〈W,<, V 〉 and a world w ∈W such that M,w |H F . We say that a formula F is valid in a rational model
M= 〈W,<, V 〉, and we write M |H F , if, for all w ∈W , it holds that M,w |H F . We say that a formula F is valid if it is
valid in all rational models, i.e. if, for all rational models M= 〈W,<, V 〉, it holds that M |H F .
Given a set of formulas K of L and a model M = 〈W,<, V 〉, we say that M is a model of K , written M |H K , if for
every F ∈ K and every w ∈W , we have that M,w |H F . K rationally entails a formula F , written K |H F if F is valid in all
rational models of K .
It is easy to see from Definition 1 that the truth condition of A |∼ B is “global” in a model M = 〈W,<, V 〉: given a
world w , we have that M,w |H A |∼ B if, for all w ′ , if w ′ ∈MinM< (A) then M,w
′ |H B . It immediately follows that A |∼ B
holds in w if and only if A |∼ B is valid in a model, i.e. it holds that M,w ′ |H A |∼ B for all w ′ in W ; for this reason we
will often write M |H A |∼ B . Moreover, when the reference to the model M is unambiguous, we will simply write Min<(A)
instead of MinM< (A).
Theorems 6.8 and 6.9 in [18] provide a constructive proof of the following finite model property of R.
Fact 1. Given a set of formulas K , if it is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a finite model. Furthermore, if a given F is satisfiable in a
model of K (for K 6|H ¬F ), then F is satisfiable in a finite model of K .
From now on, we will restrict our consideration to rational models with a finite set of worlds.
Given a rational model M = 〈W,<, V 〉, let us now define the rank kM(w) of a world w and the rank kM(F ) of a
formula F .
Definition 2 (Rank kM(w) of a world inM). Given a (finite) rational model M= 〈W,<, V 〉, the rank kM of a world w ∈W ,
written kM(w), is the length of the longest chain w0 < . . . < w from w to a minimal w0 (i.e. there is no w
′ such that
w ′ < w0).
This definition makes sense even if the relation < is not modular. Observe that, for a modular relation on a finite set, all
maximal chains2 from an element w to a minimal w0 have the same length.
The previous definition defines from < a rank function kM :W 7−→ N. The opposite is also possible and in general in
rational models the rank function kM and < can be defined from each other by letting x< y if and only if kM(x) < kM(y)
(this is similarly stated by [33] where a rank function k over a possibly infinite set is used, since there is no restriction to
finite models) Hence, modular preferential models are called ranked models.
Definition 3 (Rank kM(F ) of a formula in a model). The rank kM(F ) of a formula F in a model M is i = min{kM(w) :
M,w |H F }. If there is no w such that M,w |H F , then we say F has no rank in M.
It is easy to observe that:
Proposition 1. For anyM= 〈W,<, V 〉, we haveM |H A |∼ B if and only if kM(A ∧ B) < kM(A ∧¬B) or A has no rank inM.
2 A chain w0 < w1 < . . . < wn is maximal if there is no element w
′ such that for some i = 0, . . . ,n− 1 it holds w i < w
′ < w i+1 .
ARTICLE IN PRESS
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
Please cite this article in press as: L. Giordano et al., Semantic characterization of rational closure: From propositional logic to description logics,
Artificial Intelligence (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2015.05.001
JID:ARTINT AID:2844 /FLA [m3G; v1.152; Prn:12/05/2015; 12:28] P.6 (1-33)
6 L. Giordano et al. / Artificial Intelligence ••• (••••) •••–•••
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
36 36
37 37
38 38
39 39
40 40
41 41
42 42
43 43
44 44
45 45
46 46
47 47
48 48
49 49
50 50
51 51
52 52
53 53
54 54
55 55
56 56
57 57
58 58
59 59
60 60
61 61
2.2. Lehmann and Magidor’s definition of rational closure
Although the operator |∼ is nonmonotonic, the notion of rational entailment (defined in Definition 1) in itself is monotonic:
if K |H F and K ⊆ K ∗ then also K ∗ |H F .
In order to strengthen R, Lehmann and Magidor in [33] propose the well-known mechanism of rational closure. As
already mentioned, the main motivation of Lehmann and Magidor leading to the definition of rational closure was technical:
it turns out that the intersection of all rational consequence relations satisfying a set of conditionals coincides with the
weaker preferential consequence relation satisfying that set (that is weaker in that it does not satisfy (RM)), so that (i)
the axiom/rule (RM) does not add anything and (ii) such relation in itself fails to satisfy (RM). Lehmann and Magidor’s
notion of rational closure provides a solution to both problems and can be seen as the “minimal” (in some sense) rational
consequence completing a set of conditionals.
Since in rational closure no boolean combination of conditionals is allowed, in the following, the knowledge base K is
just a finite set of positive conditional assertions of the form A |∼ B . In such a case, rational entailment is equivalent to
preferential entailment.
Definition 4 (Exceptionality of propositional formulas and conditional formulas). Let K be a knowledge base (i.e. a finite set of
positive conditional assertions) and A a propositional formula. A is said to be exceptional for K if and only if K |H ⊤ |∼¬A.
A conditional formula A |∼ B is exceptional for K if its antecedent A is exceptional for K . The set of conditional formulas
of K which are exceptional for K will be denoted as E(K ).
It is possible to define a non-increasing sequence of subsets of K , C0 ⊇ C1,C1 ⊇ C2, . . . by letting C0 = K and, for i > 0, C i
the set of conditionals of C i−1 exceptional for C i−1 , i.e. C i = E(C i−1). Observe that, being K finite, there is an n≥ 0 such that
Cn = ∅ or for all m> n, Cm = Cn . The sets C i are used to define the rank of a formula, as in the next definition. Notice that
if there is an m such that Cm = Cm+1 , then for all k>m, it will hold that Cm = Ck (indeed E(Cm)= E(Cm+1)= . . .= E(Ck)).
Definition 5 (Rank of a formula). A propositional formula A has rank i (for K ), written rank(A)= i, if and only if i is the least
natural number for which A is not exceptional for C i . If A is exceptional for all C i then A has no rank.
As mentioned above, we can restrict our consideration to sequences C0, . . . ,Cn where Cn is the first set in the sequence
such that either Cn = ∅ or Cn = Cn+1: in both cases for all t > n, Ct = Cn , therefore the formulas exceptional for Ct and Cn
coincide. For this reason, if a formula A has a rank, then rank(A)≤ n.
The notion of rank of a formula allows to define the rational closure of a knowledge base K .
Definition 6 (Rational closure K of K ). Let K be a conditional knowledge base. The rational closure K of K is the set of all
A |∼ B such that either (1) the rank of A is strictly less than the rank of A ∧ ¬B (this includes the case A has a rank and
A ∧¬B has none), or (2) A has no rank.
This mechanism, which is now well-established, allows to overcome some weaknesses of R. First of all, it is closed under
rational monotonicity (RM): if (A |∼ B) ∈ K and (A |∼ ¬C) /∈ K then (A ∧ C) |∼ B ∈ K . Furthermore, rational closure supports
some of the wanted inferences that R does not support. For instance rational closure allows to deal with irrelevance: from
monday |∼ go_work, it does support the nonmonotonic conclusion that monday ∧ shines |∼ go_work. In order to see that
monday ∧ shines |∼ go_work belongs to the rational closure of K = {monday |∼ go_work}, observe that K 6|H ⊤ |∼¬(monday ∧
shines), therefore rank(monday ∧ shines) = 0. On the other hand, K |H ⊤ |∼ ¬(monday ∧ shines ∧ ¬ go_work), therefore
rank(monday ∧ shines ∧¬go_work) > 0, from which we derive our nonmonotonic conclusion.
2.3. A semantic characterization of rational closure
Can we capture rational closure semantically?
We aim to provide a semantic reconstruction of rational closure in terms of a minimal models’ mechanism, thus provid-
ing an instantiation of the following general recipe for nonmonotonic reasoning:
(i) fix an underlying modal semantics for conditionals (here we concentrate on R but another possible choice could have
been the weaker P, as done for instance in [19,23,17]),
(ii) obtain nonmonotonic inference by restricting semantic consequence to a class of “minimal” models. These minimal
models should be chosen on the basis of semantic considerations, independent from the language and from the set of
conditionals (knowledge base) whose nonmonotonic consequences we want to determine.
In some respects, this approach is similar in spirit to “minimal models” approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning, such as
circumscription [35]. However, as a difference with circumscription, the models (i) have a modal semantics, and (ii) the
preference relation among models is independent from the language. This second aspect is also what differentiates this
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general recipe from other previous proposals such as [19], in which the idea is that preferred models are those ones that
minimize the truth of specific formulas of the form ¬¬A.
The minimal model mechanism is based on comparing different models in order to see which one is preferred. As for
circumscription, there are mainly two ways of comparing models with the same domain:
• by keeping the valuation function fixed (only comparing M and M′ if V and V ′ in the two models coincide);
or
• by comparing M and M′ also in case V 6= V ′ .
We consider the two possible semantics resulting from these alternatives.
As already mentioned, in this paper we limit our attention to knowledge bases K that are finite and that contain only
positive conditionals. We begin by proving a property that links the rank kM of a formula in any rational model M of a
given knowledge base K and the rank of that formula as calculated in the definition of rational closure (Definition 5). The
proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.18 in [33].
In the next proposition we shall use the notion of Mi defined as follows. Let M = 〈W,<, V 〉 be any rational model
of K . Let M0 =M and, for all i, let Mi = 〈Wi,<i, V i〉 be the rational model obtained from M by removing all the
worlds w with kM(w) < i, i.e., Wi = {w ∈W | kM(w)≥ i}. The C i sets are those ones used to define the rank of a formula
in Definition 5.
Proposition 2. LetM= 〈W,<, V 〉 be any rational model of K . For any propositional formula A, if rank(A)≥ i, then 1) kM(A)≥ i,
and 2) if A |∼ B is rationally entailed by C i , thenMi satisfies A |∼ B .
Proof. By induction on i. For i = 0, statement 1) holds, since it always holds that kM(A) ≥ 0. Statement 2) also holds
trivially.
For i > 0, 1) holds: if rank(A)≥ i, then by Definition 5 for all j < i, C j |H ⊤ |∼ ¬A. By inductive hypothesis on 2), for all
j < i we have M j |H ⊤ |∼ ¬A. Hence, for all w with kM(w) < i, M,w |H ¬A, and kM(A) ≥ i. To prove 2), we reason as
follows. Since C i ⊆ C0 , M |H C i . Furthermore by definition of rank, for all A |∼ B ∈ C i , rank(A)≥ i, hence by 1) just proved
kM(A)≥ i. Hence Min
M
< (A)⊆Wi , and (given that M |H A |∼ B) also Mi |H A |∼ B . Therefore Mi |H C i . 2
A consequence of the previous proposition is the following.
Proposition 3. LetM= 〈W,<, V 〉 be any rational model of K . For all w such that kM(w)= i, it holds thatM,w |H {A→ B | A |∼
B ∈ C i}.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,<, V 〉 be any rational model of K . If i = 0, then for a contradiction suppose for some w with
kM(w)= 0, and for some A→ B : A |∼ B ∈ C0 , M,w |H A∧¬B . In this case obviously w ∈Min
M
< (A), which contradicts that
MinM< (A)⊆ {w ∈W |M,w |H B} (being M a model of K and A |∼ B ∈ K ). Therefore the proposition must hold. If i > 0 we
repeat the same reasoning just done by considering Mi instead of M: by Proposition 2, Mi satisfies C i . By reasoning as
for i = 0 we conclude that for all w with kMi (w)= 0, Mi,w |H {A→ B : A |∼ B ∈ C i}. By definition of Mi it follows that,
for all w , it holds kM(w)= i, then M,w |H {A→ B : A |∼ B ∈ C i}. 2
Before we conclude the section we introduce one last proposition that we will use in the following.
Proposition 4. For all K and A, if K |H A |∼⊥, then for all C i , C i |H A |∼⊥, and C i |H ⊤ |∼¬A, i.e. A has no rank.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that K |H A |∼⊥, but for some i, C i 6|H A |∼⊥. In particular, let us consider the least i
such that C i 6|H A |∼⊥. By definition of C i we can assume that C0 ⊃ . . . ⊃ C i−1 ⊃ C i . Consider a model M = 〈W,<, V 〉
of C i in which it does not hold that A |∼⊥, i.e. in which {w ∈W |M |H A} 6= ∅. By definition of C i , for all conditionals
A1 |∼ B1 . . . An |∼ Bn in C i−1 − C i , it holds that C i−1 6|H ⊤ |∼ ¬A1, . . . ,C i−1 6|H ⊤ |∼ ¬An , i.e. there are rational models M1 =
〈W1,<1, V1〉, . . . ,Mn = 〈Wn,<n, Vn〉 of C i−1 in which ⊤ |∼ ¬A1, . . . ,⊤ |∼ ¬An does not hold, respectively, i.e., in which
there are worlds x1, . . . , xn (respectively) such that kM1 (x1) = 0, . . . ,kMn (xn) = 0, and M1, x1 |H A1, . . . ,Mn, xn |H An .
Consider now the model M′ = 〈W ′,<′, V ′〉 obtained from M by letting W ′ =W ∪ {x1, . . . , xn}, V
′ = V for all worlds
of W , whereas V = V1, . . . , Vn for the worlds x1, . . . , xn respectively. Let kM′ (x1) = 0, . . . ,kM′ (xn) = 0, whereas for all
w ∈W , let kM′ (w) = kM(w) + 1. Define <
′ accordingly. We can prove that M′ satisfies C i−1: for conditionals Ai |∼ B i
in C i this follows since for sure the minimal Ai-worlds will be worlds already in the starting M (since C i−1 |H ⊤ |∼ ¬Ai
hence none of the x1, . . . , xn is an Ai-world), and keep satisfying Ai |∼ B i as they did it in M. For Ai |∼ B i ∈ C i−1 − C i , by
construction of M′ , the minimal Ai-worlds will be one of the x1, . . . , xn just introduced, and they satisfy the conditional
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since they did so in the original models. Furthermore in M′ there is an A-world (for the A of the proposition), which shows
that C i−1 6|H A |∼⊥. This contradicts the assumption that i is the least natural number such that C i 6|H A |∼⊥. 2
2.3.1. Fixed versus variable interpretations minimal models semantics
The first semantics we consider is a fixed interpretations minimal semantics, for short FIMS.
Definition 7 (FIMS). Given models M= 〈W,<, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′,<′, V ′〉, we say that M is preferred to M′ with respect
to the fixed interpretations minimal semantics, and we write M<FIMS M
′ , if
• W =W ′
• V = V ′
• for all x, kM(x)≤ kM′ (x) whereas there exists x
′ such that kM(x
′) < kM′ (x
′).
Given a knowledge base K , we say that M is a minimal model of K with respect to <FIMS if M is a model of K and
there is no M′ such that M′ is a model of K and M′ <FIMS M. We say that K minimally entails a formula F with respect
to FIMS, and we write K |HFIMS F , if F is valid in all models of K that are minimal with respect to <FIMS (among all the
possible models of K ).
Proposition 5. Given a finite modelM of K , eitherM is a minimal FIMS model of K or there is a finite minimal FIMS modelM′ of K
such thatM′ <FIMS M.
In our second semantics, we let the interpretations vary. The semantics is called variable interpretations minimal seman-
tics, for short VIMS.
Definition 8 (VIMS). Given models M= 〈W,<, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′,<′, V ′〉 we say that M is preferred to M′ with respect
to the variable interpretations minimal semantics, and write M<VIMS M
′ , if
• W =W ′
• for all x, kM(x)≤ kM′ (x) whereas there exists x
′ such that kM(x
′) < kM′ (x
′).
Given a knowledge base K , we say that M is a minimal model of K with respect to <VIMS if M is a model of K and there
is no M′ such that M′ is a model of K and M′ <VIMS M. K minimally entails a formula F with respect to VIMS, and we
write K |HVIMS F , if F is valid in all models of K that are minimal with respect to <VIMS (among all the possible models
of K ).
It is easy to realize that the two semantics, FIMS and VIMS, define different sets of minimal models. This is illustrated by
the following example.
Example 1. Let K = {penguin |∼ bird,penguin |∼¬fly,bird |∼ fly}. We derive that K 6|HFIMS penguin∧ black |∼¬fly. Indeed in FIMS
there can be a model M in which W = {x, y, z}, V (x)= {penguin,bird,fly,black}, V (y)= {penguin,bird}, V (z)= {bird,fly},
and z < y < x. M is a model of K , and it is minimal with respect to FIMS (indeed once fixed V (x), V (y), V (z) as above,
it is not possible to lower the rank of x nor of y nor of z unless we falsify K ). Furthermore, in M x is a typical world
in which “it is a penguin” and “it is black” hold (since there is no other world satisfying the same propositions which is
preferred to it) where “it flies” holds. Therefore, K 6|HFIMS penguin∧ black |∼¬fly.
On the other hand, M is not minimal with respect to VIMS. Indeed, consider the model M′ = 〈W,<′, V ′〉 obtained
from M by letting V ′(x) = {penguin,bird,black}, V ′(y) = V (y), V ′(z) = V (z) and by defining <′ as: z <′ y and z <′ x.
Clearly M′ |H K , and M′ <VIMS M, since kM′ (x) < kM(x), while kM′ = kM for all other worlds.
The example above shows that FIMS and VIMS lead to different sets of minimal models for a given K . Notice, however,
that the model M′ we have used to illustrate this fact is not a minimal model for K in VIMS. A minimal model in VIMS
for K that can be defined on the set of worlds W is given by V (x)= V (y)= V (z)= {bird,fly}, and the empty relation <.
This is quite a degenerate model of K in which “it is a penguin” is never true. This illustrates the strength of VIMS: in case of
knowledge bases that only contain positive conditionals, logical entailment in VIMS collapses into classical logic entailment.
This feature corresponds to a similar feature of the nonmonotonic logic Pmin in [19] (see Section 2.4), can be proven in the
same way, and leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let K be a set of positive conditionals. Let us replace all formulas of the form A |∼ B in K with A→ B , and call K ◦ the
resulting set of formulas. We have that K |HVIMS A |∼ B if and only if K
◦ |HPC A→ B .
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As for Pmin this strong feature of VIMS can be prevented by adding existence assertions to the knowledge base, in the
example we could add, for instance, ¬(penguin |∼⊥) to force us to consider non-trivial models where the proposition “it is a
penguin” is satisfied. In the next section, we will apply VIMS in a similar way, by restricting our consideration to knowledge
bases that include existence assertions (expressed by negated conditionals).
2.3.2. A semantic reconstruction of rational closure
Can we capture rational closure within one or the other of the semantics above? A first conjecture might be that the
FIMS of Definition 7 could capture rational closure. However, we are soon forced to recognize that this is not the case.
For instance, Example 1 above illustrates that {penguin |∼ bird,penguin |∼ ¬fly,bird |∼ fly} 6|HFIMS penguin∧ black |∼ ¬fly. On the
contrary, it can be easily verified that penguin ∧ black |∼ ¬fly is in the rational closure of {penguin |∼ bird,penguin |∼ ¬fly,
bird |∼ fly}. Therefore, FIMS as it is does not allow us to define a semantics corresponding to rational closure. Things change
if we consider FIMS applied to models that contain all possible valuations compatible with a given knowledge base K . We call
these models canonical models.
Example 2. Consider Example 1 above. If we restrict our attention to models that also contain a world w with V (w) =
{penguin,bird,black} which satisfies “it is a penguin”, “it is black” and “it does not fly” in which w is a typical world satis-
fying “it is a penguin”, we are able to conclude that typically it holds that if it is a penguin and it is black then it does not fly, the
same as in rational closure. Indeed, in all minimal FIMS models of K that also contain w with V (w)= {penguin,bird,black},
it holds that penguin∧ black |∼¬fly (in particular, in Example 1 above, adding w to M would give z< w and w < x).
We are led to the conjecture that FIMS restricted to canonical models could be the right semantics for rational closure.
Canonical models are defined with respect to the language L restricted to the propositional variables occurring in the
knowledge base and in the query. Given a knowledge base K and a query Q , let ATMK ,Q be the set of all the propositional
variables of ATM occurring in K or in the query Q , and let LK ,Q be the restriction of the language L to the propositional
variables in ATMK ,Q .
A truth assignment v : ATMK,Q −→ {true, false} is compatible with K , if there is no propositional formula A ∈ LK ,Q such
that v(A)= true and K |H A |∼⊥ (where v is extended to arbitrary propositional formulas as usual).
Definition 9 (Canonical model). A model M= 〈W,<, V 〉 satisfying a knowledge base K is said to be canonical if it contains
(at least) a world associated to each truth assignment compatible with K , that is to say: if v is compatible with K , then
there exists a world w in W such that, for all propositional formulas B ∈LK ,Q , M,w |H B if and only if v(B)= true.
It can be easily shown that, for any knowledge base, a minimal canonical FIMS model exists: this is any canonical model
in which every possible world w has the rank associated to the conjunction of all atoms and negated atoms in LK ,Q that
it satisfies. This is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any satisfiable K there exists a finite minimal canonical FIMS modelM.
Proof. Since K is satisfiable consider a model M= 〈W,<, V 〉 of K . Given the finite model property of R, we can assume,
without loss of generality that M has a finite set of worlds. Let v1, . . . , vr be any enumeration of the truth assignments
v i : ATMK,Q −→ {true, false} compatible with K . Observe that, since ATMK,Q is a finite set of propositional variables, the truth
assignments v i as defined above are finitely many.
We proceed starting from M and extending it by the addition of new worlds. Let M0 =M. For each i, from 1 to r, we
reason as follows. If there is no world in Mi−1 associated to v i , consider a model M
′ = 〈W ′,<′, V ′〉 of K in which there is
at least a world associated to v i . Such a model M
′ exists since v i is compatible with K . By Fact 1, we can assume M
′ to
be finite as well. We add to Mi−1 all the worlds in M
′ , to get Mi = 〈Wi,<i, V i〉, where: (1) Wi =Wi−1 ∪W
′; (2) <i is
defined as <i−1 on the worlds in Wi−1; it is defined as <
′ on the worlds in W ′ and, for all x ∈Wi−1 and y ∈W
′ , x<i y;
(3) V i is defined as V i−1 on the worlds in Wi−1 and it is defined as V
′ on the worlds in W ′ .
Observe, that the resulting model Mi is the juxtaposition of the two models Mi−1 and M
′ , where the rank of each
world in Mi−1 is lower than the rank of each world in M
′ . It is finite, as both Mi−1 and M
′ are finite.
It is easy to see that, if Mi−1 satisfies K , then Mi satisfies K as well. Consider any conditional C |∼ B ∈ K , and any
world w ∈ MinMi<i (C). Then either w ∈ Wi−1 or w ∈ W
′ . If w ∈ Wi−1 , then w ∈ Min
Mi−1
<i (C), by the definition of <i .
Since Mi−1 is a model of K , Mi−1 |H C |∼ B and Mi−1,w |H B . By construction, V i(w) = V i−1(w), so that Mi,w |H B ,
and Mi |H C |∼ B . If w ∈W
′ , then w ∈ MinM
′
<i
(C), by the definition of <i . Since M
′ is a model of K , M′ |H C |∼ B and
M′,w |H B . By construction, V i(w)= V
′(w), so that Mi,w |H B , and Mi |H C |∼ B .
Given that M0 =M is a model of K , we conclude that all the M1,M2, . . . ,Mr are models of K . After all the valuations
v1, . . . , vr have been considered, we obtain a model Mr of K which is canonical and is finite as well, as we have only
considered finite models in the construction of Mr . From Mr , by Proposition 5, we can obtain a minimal canonical FIMS
model. 2
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In the following, we show that the canonical models that are minimal with respect to FIMS are an adequate semantic
counterpart of rational closure.
Proposition 7. Let M = 〈W,<, V 〉 be a canonical model of K , minimal with respect to <FIMS . Given i ∈ N, for all w ∈W it holds
that: ifM,w |H A→ B for all A |∼ B in C i , then kM(w)≤ i.
Proof. The proof is by induction on i. If i = 0, suppose for a contradiction that there is a w such that M,w |H A→ B for
all A |∼ B in C0 , but kM(w) > 0. Then it can be easily seen that the canonical model obtained from M by simply changing
kM(w) into 0 is still a model of C0 = K and it is preferred to M, thus contradicting the minimality of M.
For i > 0, we reason in a similar way: let us consider w ∈ W such that for all A |∼ B in C i , M,w |H A → B but
kM(w) > i. Let M
′ be a model obtained from M by changing < in order to have kM′ (w)= i. M
′ is preferred to M and
it is a model of K , as it satisfies all the conditionals in K . Let A |∼ B ∈ K . It is clear that, for all the worlds w ′ ∈W with
w ′ 6= w , w ′ satisfies A |∼ B in M′ , as it satisfies it in M. To show that w satisfies A |∼ B , let w ∈MinM
′
< (A). If A |∼ B in C i ,
we know from the hypothesis that w satisfies A → B , and hence, w satisfies B . If A |∼ B in K − C i , there is a j < i such
that A |∼ B ∈ C j , C j 6|H ⊤ |∼¬A while C j−1 |H ⊤ |∼¬A. From C j 6|H ⊤ |∼¬A, it follows that there is a model M j of C j with a
w◦ such that kM j (w
◦)= 0 and w◦ satisfies A. By Proposition 3, we have that M j,w
◦ satisfies {A→ B : A |∼ B ∈ C j} ∪ {A},
hence C j 6|H A1 → B1 ∧ . . .∧ Am → Bm ∧ A |∼⊥ and, by Proposition 4, we have that K 6|H A1 → B1 ∧ . . .∧ Am → Bm ∧ A |∼⊥.
Since M′ (as M) is canonical, it follows that there is a world w∗ ∈W such that w∗ satisfies all the implications A′ → B ′
s.t. A′ |∼ B ′ in C j and w
∗ satisfies A. By inductive hypothesis, kM(w
∗) < i, and therefore kM(A) < i. By construction of M
′ ,
kM′ (w
∗) < i, and therefore kM′ (A) < i which contradicts the hypothesis that w ∈Min
M′
< (A). Hence, M
′ satisfies all the
conditionals in K . The fact that kM(w) > i and kM′ (w)= i contradicts the minimality of M. Hence, it must be kM(w)≤ i,
and the proof is over. 2
Proposition 8. Let M be a canonical model of K minimal with respect to <FIMS . Then, given i ∈ N, rank(A) = i if and only if
kM(A)= i.
Proof. (Only if part) Let us assume that rank(A) = i. By definition of rank, we know that C i 6|H ⊤ |∼ ¬A. Then there is a
rational model M′ of C i that does not satisfy ⊤ |∼ ¬A. In M
′ there must be a world w ′ , with kM′ (w
′) = 0 such that
M′,w ′ |H A. For all propositional formulas B ∈ L, such that M′,w ′ |H B , it must be the case that C i that does not satisfy
⊤ |∼¬B in M′ . Hence, for all propositional formulas B ∈ L, such that M′,w ′ |H B , C i 6|H ⊤ |∼¬B . Let B
′ be the conjunction
of all these Bs. Clearly, A is one of the conjuncts of B ′ . Furthermore, C i 6|H ⊤ |∼ ¬B
′ . By Proposition 4, from C i 6|H ⊤ |∼ ¬B
′ ,
it follows that K 6|H B ′ |∼ ⊥. Let v be the truth assignment associated with the world w ′ of M′ . Then v is compatible
with K . Since M is a canonical model, there must be a world w ∈ W of M such that for all propositional formulas
B ∈ L, M,w |H B if and only if v(B) = true. In particular, we have that M,w |H A. We show that, for all D |∼ B ∈ C i ,
M,w |H D → B . Observe that D and B are propositional formulas and that their valuation is the same in w and in w ′ .
Hence it is sufficient to show that M′,w ′ |H D → B , for all D |∼ B ∈ C i . This follows from the fact that M
′,w ′ |H D |∼ B holds
for all D |∼ B ∈ C i . Indeed, if M
′,w ′ 6|H D , it trivially holds that M′,w ′ |H D → B . If M′,w ′ |H D , then (since kM′ (w
′)= 0),
w ′ ∈MinM
′
<′ (D), and hence M
′,w ′ |H B . Thus, M′,w ′ |H D → B .
Now, there is a world w ∈ W such that, for all D |∼ B ∈ C i , w satisfies D → B . By Proposition 7, kM(w) ≤ i. Since w
satisfies A, kM(A)≤ i. As by Proposition 2 we know that kM(A)≥ i, we can conclude that kM(A)= i.
(If part) This direction is obvious, given the only if part: if kM(A)= i, then rank(A)= i. Indeed, by absurd, if rank(A)=
j 6= i, then kM(A)= j 6= i, against the hypothesis. 2
A direct consequence of Proposition 8 together with the observation that if a formula has a rank then its maximal value
is n where n is the last element of C0 ⊃ . . . ⊃ Cn such that Cn = ∅ or such that for all m > n, Cm = Cn is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let n be the last element of C0 ⊃ . . . ⊃ Cn such that Cn = ∅ or such that for all m > n Cm = Cn , then in all minimal
canonical modelsM, for all worlds w , kM(w)≤ n.
We can now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let K be a knowledge base and M be a canonical model of K minimal with respect to <FIMS . We show that, for all
conditionals A |∼ B ∈L:
M |H A |∼ B if and only if A |∼ B ∈ K ,
where K is the rational closure of K .
Proof. (Only if part) Let us assume that M= 〈W,<, V 〉 satisfies A |∼ B . Then, for each world w ∈Min<(A), w satisfies B . If
Min<(A)= ∅, then there is no w s.t. M,w |H A, hence A has no rank in M and, by Proposition 8, A has no rank. In this
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case, by Definition 6, A |∼ B ∈ K . Let us assume that kM(A) = i. As kM(A ∧ B) < kM(A ∧ ¬B), then kM(A ∧ ¬B) > i. By
Proposition 8, rank(A)= i and rank(A ∧¬B) > i. Hence, by Definition 6, A |∼ B ∈ K .
(If part) If A |∼ B belongs to K , then, by Definition 6, either (a) rank(A) < rank(A ∧ ¬B) (or A has a rank and A ∧ ¬B
has not), or (b) A has no rank. In the first case (a), by Proposition 8 we have that kM(A) < kM(A ∧ ¬B), which entails
kM(A ∧ B) < kM(A ∧ ¬B). Hence M satisfies A |∼ B . In case, A has a rank and A ∧ ¬B has not, suppose rank(A)= i. By
Proposition 8, kM(A)= i. It is easy to show that kM(A ∧¬B) > i. If, by absurdum, kM(A ∧¬B)≤ i, by Proposition 8, we
would have rank(A ∧¬B)≤ i, against the hypothesis that A ∧¬B has no rank.
In case (b), by Proposition 8, A has no rank in M, hence M satisfies A |∼ B . 2
In Theorem 2 we have shown a correspondence between rational closure and minimal models with fixed interpretations,
on the proviso that we restrict our attention to minimal canonical models. We can obtain the same effect by extending K into
K ′ by adding negated conditionals:
Definition 10. Let K be a knowledge base. We define
K ′ = K ∪ {¬(C |∼⊥) | C = (¬)A1 ∧ (¬)A2 ∧ . . .∧ (¬)An,
such that Ai ∈ ATMK ,Q , with i = 1,2, . . . ,n, and K 6|H (C |∼⊥)}
(that is C is a conjunction of literals whose propositional variables occur in the knowledge base or in the query).
Indeed it can be easily verified that all models of K ′ are canonical, hence restricting FIMS to canonical models on the
one hand and considering the extension of K as K ′ on the other hand amounts to the same effect. We can therefore restate
Theorem 2 above as follows:
Theorem 3. Let K be a knowledge base and let K ′ be defined as in Definition 10. It holds that
K ′ |HFIMS A |∼ B if and only if A |∼ B ∈ K ,
where K is the rational closure of K .
Notice that the size of K ′ is exponential in that of K .
Before we go any further, let us point out that this characterization of rational closure, in terms of minimal canonical
FIMS models, is related to Lehmann and Magidor’s semantical characterization in [33]: we use canonical models, as they
do, and we show a correspondence between the rank of a formula (syntactically defined in terms of exceptionality) and
the rank of the formula in minimal canonical FIMS models. However the definition of minimal canonical FIMS models that
we use here, based on a specific preference relation between different canonical models, is different from the definition
provided in [33] (see Section 5.3, Definition 20) where the involved preference relation is defined in terms of conditionals
satisfied in the compared models.
We may wonder whether the restriction to canonical models can be lifted by adopting a semantics based on variable
valuations. In general the answer is negative. We have already mentioned that, if we consider knowledge bases containing
only positive conditionals, logical entailment in VIMS collapses into classical logic entailment. To avoid this collapse, we
can require that, when we are checking for entailment of a conditional A |∼ B from a K , at least an A ∧ B-world and an
A ∧ ¬B-world be present in the models of K . This can be obtained by adding to K the conditionals ¬(A ∧ B |∼ ⊥) and
¬(A ∧¬B |∼⊥). Also in this case, however, we cannot give a positive answer to the above question. Indeed, it is possible to
build a model of K , minimal with respect to VIMS, which falsifies a conditional A |∼ B which, on the contrary, is satisfied in
all the canonical minimal models of K under FIMS. This is shown by the following:
Example 3. Let K be as follows:
{⊤ |∼ S,
S |∼¬D,
L |∼ P ,
R |∼ Q ,
E |∼ F ,
H |∼ G,
D |∼¬P ∧¬Q ∧¬F ∧¬G,
S |∼¬(L ∧ R),
S |∼¬(L ∧ E),
S |∼¬(L ∧ H),
S |∼¬(R ∧ E),
S |∼¬(R ∧ H),
S |∼¬(E ∧ H)}.
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Let
A = D ∧ S ∧ R ∧ L ∧ E ∧ H,
B =¬Q ∧¬P ∧¬F ∧¬G
and let
K ′ = K ∪ {¬(A ∧ B |∼⊥), ¬(A ∧¬B |∼⊥)}.
We define a model M= (W,<, V ) of K ′ , which is minimal with respect to VIMS, as follows: W = {x,w, y1.y2, y3}, where:
V (y1)= {S,¬D,¬R,¬L,¬E,¬H, P , Q , F ,G}
V (y2)= {¬S,¬D, R, L, E, H, P , Q , F ,G}
V (y3)= {¬S, D,¬P ,¬Q ,¬F ,¬G,¬R,¬L,¬E,¬H}
V (x)= {D, S, R, L, E, H,¬Q ,¬P ,¬F ,¬G}
V (w)= {D, S, R, L, E, H, Q ,¬P ,¬F ,¬G}
with kM(y1)= 0, kM(y2)= 1, kM(y3)= 1, kM(x)= 2 and kM(w)= 2. Observe that: x is an A ∧ B-minimal world; w is
an A ∧ ¬B-minimal world; y1 is an S-minimal world; y2 is a minimal world for R , L, E and H ; and y3 is a D-minimal
world.
M is a model of K which is minimal with respect to VIMS. Also, A |∼ B is falsified in M, while, on the contrary, A |∼ B
holds in all the canonical models minimal with respect to FIMS. Indeed, in all such models the rank of k(A ∧ B)= 1 while
k(A ∧ ¬B) = 2. However, it is not possible to construct a model M′ with 5 worlds so that M′ <VIMS M. In particular,
lowering the rank of w is never possible, since w is a non-typical D-world, and typical D-worlds are non-typical ⊤-worlds,
hence w will always have rank at least 2. For x we reason in a different way: although in principle it could have rank 1,
assigning to x rank 1 entails that there are at least 4 distinct R , L, E and H-worlds with rank 0. But this is impossible given
that we have only 5 worlds in the model. In order to satisfy all these formulas by a single world, we have to introduce a
world at level 1 (which can be a non-S and therefore satisfy pairs of these formulas). This is world y2 , whose rank cannot
therefore be lowered. y2 cannot be a D-world, we therefore need y3 which is a minimal D-world that can have rank at
least 1 and whose rank cannot therefore be lowered.
As suggested by this example, in order to characterize rational closure in terms of VIMS, we should restrict our consider-
ation to models which contain “enough” worlds. In the following, as in Theorem 3, we enrich K with negated conditionals
but, as a difference with K ′ of Theorem 3, we only need to add to K a polynomial number of negated conditionals (instead
of an exponential number). The purpose of the addition is that of restricting our attention to models that are minimal with
respect to <VIMS and that have a set of worlds “large” enough to have, in principle, a distinct most-preferred world for each
antecedent of conditionals in K . Intuitively, this condition discards the models, as the one illustrated by the example above,
in which a formula (e.g. A∧ B) has a rank higher than the rank it could have just because there are not enough worlds (and
lowering the rank of a formula would lead to the falsification of some conditionals in K ).
For this reason, we expand K into K ′′ by adding, for each antecedent C of a conditional formulas in K , a new corre-
sponding atom φC , and by requiring that all these new atoms are mutually disjoint. This will guarantee that all models
of K ′′ will have a distinct world satisfying each newly introduced atom φC and its corresponding formula C . Furthermore,
if the problem to be addressed is that of knowing whether A |∼ B is logically entailed by K , we also introduce φA∧B and
φA∧¬B in order to also have a distinct world associated to A∧ B and A∧¬B . This is stated in a formal way in the following
definition.
Definition 11. Given a knowledge base K , we define:
• AK ,A|∼B = {C | either, for some D,C |∼ D ∈ K or C = A ∧ B or C = A ∧¬B, and K 6|H C |∼⊥};
• K ′′ = K ∪ {¬(C ∧ φC |∼⊥) : C ∈ AK ,A|∼B} ∪ {(φC i ∧ φC j |∼⊥) : C i,C j ∈ AK ,A|∼B}.
We can now establish a correspondence between FIMS and VIMS. By virtue of Theorem 2, this allows us to establish a
correspondence between rational closure and VIMS, as stated by Theorem 1.
Theorem 4. Let M be a canonical model of K , minimal with respect to FIMS, and let K ′′ be the extension of K defined as in Defini-
tion 11. We have that:
M |H A |∼ B if and only if K ′′ |HVIMS A |∼ B.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
Please cite this article in press as: L. Giordano et al., Semantic characterization of rational closure: From propositional logic to description logics,
Artificial Intelligence (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2015.05.001
JID:ARTINT AID:2844 /FLA [m3G; v1.152; Prn:12/05/2015; 12:28] P.13 (1-33)
L. Giordano et al. / Artificial Intelligence ••• (••••) •••–••• 13
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
36 36
37 37
38 38
39 39
40 40
41 41
42 42
43 43
44 44
45 45
46 46
47 47
48 48
49 49
50 50
51 51
52 52
53 53
54 54
55 55
56 56
57 57
58 58
59 59
60 60
61 61
Proof. We show the contrapositive of the two directions.
First, suppose K ′′ 6|HVIMS A |∼ B . Let M
′ = 〈W ′,<′, V ′〉 be a model of K ′′ minimal with respect to <VIMS that does not
satisfy A |∼ B , i.e., such that kM′ (A ∧ ¬B) ≤ kM′ (A ∧ B). We want to show that also M 6|H A |∼ B , i.e., kM(A ∧ ¬B) ≤
kM(A ∧ B). For a contradiction, suppose in the canonical M, kM(A ∧¬B)= j > kM(A ∧ B)= i. By Propositions 2 and 8,
kM′ (A∧¬B)≥ j and kM′ (A∧ B)≥ i, and since by hypothesis kM′ (A∧¬B)≤ kM′ (A∧ B), it follows that kM′ (A∧ B)≥ j > i.
We show that this goes against the minimality of M′ .
From M and M′ we build a model M∗ = 〈W∗,<∗, V ∗〉 such that M∗ is a model of K ′′ and M∗ <VIMS M
′ . In particular,
for each formula in AK ,A|∼B , we include in W
∗ a minimal world from M satisfying that formula. More precisely, we
introduce in W∗ the following worlds from M: x ∈MinM< (A ∧ B), x
′ ∈MinM< (A ∧¬B) and a world y ∈Min
M
< (C), for each
C antecedent of a conditional in K s.t. K 6|H C |∼⊥. For these worlds, we define V ∗ = V and kM∗ = kM . If the same element
y is associated to two different formulas it must be duplicated into y and y′ (and V ∗(y′)= V ∗(y) and kM∗ (y
′)= kM∗ (y)).
Furthermore, for each world y introduced as a representative of MinM< (C), V
∗(y) is extended in order to include φC . <
∗ is
straightly defined from kM∗ in the obvious way. The construction is almost finished. Notice that up to this point we have
introduced in W∗ no more elements than those in W ′ . To conclude we have to rename the elements of W∗ with the names
as the elements of W ′ that satisfy the same φC , and we have to add to W
∗ the elements of W ′ that are eventually missing
(we let for these cases V ∗ = V ′ and kM∗ = kM′ ).
It can be shown that M∗ is a model of K ′′ , and M∗ <VIMS M
′ , against the minimality of M′ . First of all, we
show that M∗ is a model of K ′′ . Indeed, by construction we have introduced a new element y of M for each C
antecedent of a conditional in K or equal to A ∧ B or A ∧ ¬B , and this element is still in MinM
∗
< (C) (otherwise,
kM∗ (C) < kM∗ (y) = kM(y) = kM(C), against Propositions 2 and 8). Furthermore, V
∗(y) includes φC . Hence, M
∗ satis-
fies all conditionals introduced in K ′′ with form ¬(C ∧ φC ) |∼⊥. Consider now the positive conditionals C |∼ D in K
′′ , that
were already in K . Hence, consider any y inserted in M∗ from M. Let y ∈MinM
∗
< (C). Then also y ∈Min
M
< (C) (otherwise
there would be another y′ ∈MinM< (C) with M, y
′ |H C and kM(y
′) < kM(y) that would have been taken in the construc-
tion; and by construction in M∗ it would hold that M∗, y′ |H C and kM∗ (y
′) < kM∗ (y), against y ∈ Min
M∗
< (C)). Since
M is a model of K , and C |∼ D ∈ K , M, y |H D , hence also M∗, y |H D . Consider now y introduced in M∗ from M′ . If
y ∈ MinM
∗
< (C), then we reason as follows to show that y ∈ Min
M′
< (C). First of all, we know that kM∗ (y) = kM(C). In-
deed in M∗ we have inserted a y′ that was in MinM< (C). As shown above, y
′ ∈MinM
∗
< (C). Hence kM∗ (y)= kM∗ (y
′) and
kM∗ (y) = kM(C). But by construction kM∗ (y) = kM′ (y) and if y /∈ Min
M′
< (C), there would be a y
′ s.t. M′, y′ |H C and
kM′ (y
′) < kM′ (y), hence kM′ (C) < kM(C), against Propositions 2 and 8. Hence, since C |∼ D holds in M
′ , M′, y |H D and
by construction also M, y |H D .
For the conditionals with form φC i ∧ φC j |∼⊥: they hold in M
∗ since we have suitably extended V ∗ in order to include
at most one φC at a time.
Last, it obviously holds that M∗ <VIMS M
′ . Indeed the set of worlds of the two models coincide, and for all y taken
from M′ , kM∗ (y)= kM′ (y), and for all y taken from M, they were introduced as representatives of a given C antecedent
of a conditional or equal to A ∧ B , A ∧¬B . For all these formulas by Proposition 2 and 8, it holds that kM∗ (C)= kM(C)≤
kM′ (C), hence kM∗ (y) ≤ kM′ (C). Furthermore, for A ∧ B we have shown above that kM∗ (A ∧ B) = kM(A ∧ B) = i <
kM′ (A ∧ B), hence M
∗ <VIMS M
′ , which contradicts the minimality of M′ . We conclude that if K ′′ 6|HVIMS A |∼ B , then also
K 6|HFIMS A |∼ B .
For the other direction, suppose M 6|H A |∼ B , i.e., kM(A ∧¬B) ≤ kM(A ∧ B). Let kM(A ∧ ¬B)= i and kM(A ∧ B)= j.
Consider the model M∗ built as in the first part of the construction used above. More precisely M∗ = 〈W∗,<∗, V ∗〉 is
built from M by cutting out its portion containing: x in MinM< (A ∧ B), x
′ ∈MinM< (A ∧¬B) and an element y ∈Min
M
< (C)
for each antecedent C of a conditional in K . V ∗ = V and kM∗ = kM . If the same element y is associated to two different
formulas, it must be duplicated into y and y′ (and V ∗(y′) = V ∗(y) and kM∗ (y
′)= kM∗ (y)). Furthermore, for each world
y associated to a formula C , V ∗(y) is extended in order to include φC . Last, <
∗ is defined from kM∗ in the obvious way.
By reasoning similarly to what we have done above, we can show that M∗ is a model of K ′′ . Furthermore, there cannot be
an M∗
′
<VIMS M
∗ . Indeed, any model of K ′′ must have a distinct element x satisfying C ∧ φC for each C in AK ,A|∼B . Now
suppose there was a model M∗
′
of K ′′ with M∗
′
<VIMS M
∗ . If M∗
′
<VIMS M
∗ , then for some x, kM∗′ (x) < kM∗ (x). Suppose
in M∗, x |H C ∧ φC (and hence also M
∗′ , x |H C ∧ φC ). By construction of M
∗ , kM∗ (x)= kM(C). If kM∗′ (x) < kM∗ (x), then
kM∗′ (C) < kM∗ (C), against Propositions 2 and 8. We conclude that it cannot hold M
∗′ <VIMS M
∗ , hence M∗ is a minimal
VIMS model of K ′′ . Furthermore by construction kM∗ (A ∧¬B)≤ kM∗ (A ∧ B). We conclude that K
′′ 6|HVIMS A |∼ B . 2
From Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 just shown, it follows that:
Corollary 1. Let K be a knowledge base. Given K ′′ defined as in Definition 11, it holds that
A |∼ B ∈ K if and only if K ′′ |HVIMS A |∼ B,
where K is the rational closure of K .
We conclude the section with a comparison with the related works on rational closure.
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2.4. Relation with Pmin and Pearl’s System Z
In [19] an alternative nonmonotonic extension of preferential logic P called Pmin is proposed. Similarly to the semantics
presented in this work, Pmin is based on a minimal modal semantics. However the preference relation among models is
defined in a different way. Intuitively, in Pmin the fact that a world x is a minimal A-world is expressed by the fact that
x satisfies A ∧ 2¬A, where 2 is defined with respect to the inverse of the preference relation (i.e. with respect to the
accessibility relation given by Ruv if and only if v < u). The idea is that preferred models are those that minimize the set of
worlds where ¬¬A holds, that is A-worlds which are not minimal. As a difference from the approach presented in this
work, the semantics of Pmin is defined starting from preferential models, in which the relation < is irreflexive and transitive
(thus, no longer modular).
Pmin is a nonmonotonic logic considering only P models that, intuitively, minimize the non-typical worlds. More pre-
cisely, given a set of formulas K , a model M = 〈WM,<M, VM〉 of K and a model N = 〈WN ,<N , VN 〉 of K , we say
that M is preferred to N if WM =WN , and the set of pairs (w,¬¬A) such that M,w |H ¬¬A is strictly included
in the corresponding set for N . A model M is a minimal model for K if it is a model of K and there is not a model
M′ of K which is preferred to M. Entailment in Pmin is restricted to minimal models of a given set of formulas K . In
Section 3 of [19] it is observed that the logic Pmin turns out to be quite strong. In general, if we only consider knowledge
bases containing only positive conditionals, we get the same trivialization result (part of Proposition 1 in [19]) as the one
contained in Proposition 6 for VIMS. This does not hold for rational closure. This is the reason why we have introduced the
additional assumptions in order to obtain an equivalence with rational closure. Similarly, in order to tackle this trivialization
in Pmin , Section 3 in [19] is focused on the so called well-behaved knowledge bases, that explicitly include that A is possible
(¬(A |∼⊥)) for all conditional assertions A |∼ B in the knowledge base.
We may now wonder whether Pmin is equivalent to VIMS, which is seemingly the closer semantics.
Or whether VIMS is equivalent to a stronger version of Pmin obtained by replacing P with R as the underlying logic. We
call Rmin this stronger version of Pmin .
Example 4. Let K = {PhD |∼ ¬worker,PhD |∼ adult,adult |∼ worker, italian |∼ house_owner,PhD |∼ ¬house_owner}. What do we
derive in Pmin and Rmin , and what in VIMS? By what said above, since K only contains positive conditionals, both in Pmin
and Rmin , on the one side, and in VIMS, on the other side, we derive that italian∧ PhD |∼⊥. So let us add to K the constraint
that people who are Italian and have a PhD do exist by introducing in K a conditional ¬(italian∧ PhD |∼⊥), thus obtaining:
K ′ = {PhD |∼¬worker,PhD |∼ adult,adult |∼worker, italian |∼ house_owner,PhD |∼¬house_owner,¬(italian∧ PhD |∼⊥)}.
Notice that, since ¬(italian∧ PhD |∼⊥) entails both that ¬(italian |∼⊥) and that ¬(PhD |∼⊥), and that this in turn entails
¬(adult |∼⊥), K ′ is also well-behaved.
It can be easily verified that the logical consequences of K ′ in Pmin , Rmin and VIMS differ. In both Pmin and Rmin , for
instance, we derive neither that italian∧ PhD |∼ house_owner nor that italian∧ PhD |∼¬house_owner: the two alternatives are
equivalent. On the other hand, in VIMS we derive that italian∧ PhD |∼¬house_owner.
The previous example shows that in some cases VIMS is stronger than both Pmin and Rmin . The following one shows that
the two approaches are incomparable, since there are also logical consequences that hold for both Pmin and Rmin but not
for VIMS.
Example 5. Let K = {PhD |∼ adult,adult |∼ work,PhD |∼ ¬work, italian |∼ house_owner}. What do we derive about typical
italian∧ PhD∧work, for instance? Do they inherit the property of typical Italians of being house_owner?
Again, in order to prevent the entailment of italian ∧ PhD ∧ work |∼⊥ from K both in VIMS and in Pmin and Rmin , we
add to K the constraint that Italians with a PhD who work exist, henceforth they also have typical instances. Therefore we
expand K into:
K ′ = {PhD |∼ adult,adult |∼work,PhD |∼¬work,
italian |∼ house_owner,¬(italian∧ PhD∧work |∼⊥)}.
By reasoning as in Example 4 we can show that K ′ is a well-behaved knowledge base.
Now it can be easily shown that the conditional assertion
italian∧ PhD∧work |∼ house_owner
is entailed in Pmin and Rmin , whereas nothing is entailed in VIMS. This difference can be explained intuitively as follows. The
set of properties for which an individual is atypical matters in Pmin and Rmin , where one has to minimize the set of distinct
¬¬C : even if an italian ∧ PhD ∧ work is an atypical PhD, Pmin and Rmin still maximize its typicality as an Italian, and
therefore entail that it is a house_owner, as all typical Italians. As a difference, in VIMS, what matters is the set of individuals
which are more typical than a given x, rather than the set of properties by which they are more typical. As a consequence, since
an x which is italian ∧ PhD ∧ work is an atypical PhD, there is no need to maximize its typicality as an Italian, as long as
this does not increase the set of individuals more typical than x.
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In [38] Pearl has introduced two notions of 0-entailment and 1-entailment to perform nonmonotonic reasoning. We re-
call here the semantic definition of both and then we remark upon their relation with our semantics and rational closure.
A model M for a finite knowledge base K has the form M = ({true, false}ATM,kM) where {true, false}
ATM is the set of
propositional interpretations for, say, a fixed finite propositional language, and kM is our height function mapping proposi-
tional interpretations to N, the definition of height kM(A) of a formula is the same as in our semantic. A conditional A |∼ B
is true in a model M if kM(A ∧ B) < kM(A ∧¬B). Then the two entailment relations are defined as follows:
K |H0-ent A |∼ B if A |∼ B is true in all models of K
K |H1-ent A |∼ B if A |∼ B is true in the (unique) modelM of K which isminimalwith respect to kM,
where minimal with respect to kM means that no other model M
′ assigns a lower value kM′ to any propositional in-
terpretation. First, observe that Pearl’s semantics (both 0 and 1 entailment) cannot cope with conditionals having an
inconsistent antecedent. This limitation is deliberate and is motivated by a probabilistic interpretation of conditionals:
in asserting A |∼ B , A must not be impossible, no matter how it is unlikely. For this reason, a knowledge base such as
K = {A |∼ P , A |∼ ¬P , B |∼ Q } is out of the scope of Pearl’s semantics, and nothing can be said about its consequences. As
a difference with respect to Pearl’s approach we are able to consider such K , we just derive that A is impossible, without
concluding that K is inconsistent or trivial, in the sense that everything follows from it. Moreover both 0-entailment and
1-entailment fail to validate:
∅ |H0-ent/1-ent A |∼⊥ whenever ⊢PC ¬A
which is valid in any KLM logic, whence in rational closure (as well as in our semantics). However, two definitions should
make apparent the relations with our semantics and rational closure. If we consider a K such that ∀A |∼ B ∈ K , K 6|HR A |∼⊥,
we get an obvious correspondence between our canonical models (which will contain worlds for very possible propositional
interpretation) and models of Pearl’s semantics. The correspondence preserves FIMS minimality, so that we immediately get:
Proposition 10. K |H1-ent A |∼ B if and only ifM |H A |∼ B for all canonical modelsM of K that are minimal with respect to FIMS.
By Theorem 2, we therefore obtain K |H1-ent A |∼ B if and only if A |∼ B ∈ K¯ . This is not a surprise, the correspondence
between 1-entailment and rational closure was already observed by Pearl in [38,39]. However, it only works for knowledge
bases with the strong consistency assumption as above.
3. Rational closure in description logics
As recalled in the Introduction, nonmonotonic reasoning in Description Logic has attracted an increasing interest in the
last years [40,2,1,12,30,8,23,5,32,13,37]. Our purpose is to investigate whether rational closure can be extended in order to
support nonmonotonic reasoning to Description Logics.
In this section, we extend to ALC the notion of rational closure proposed by Lehmann and Magidor [33], recalled in
Section 2.2, and we define a semantic characterization of this notion of rational closure by introducing a minimal model
semantics for ALC with typical inclusions. This semantics is a direct generalization of the minimal (canonical) model
semantics introduced in Section 2.3.
To express typical inclusions, ALC is extended with a typicality operator T, following the approach in [17,23]. Differently
from [23], here we consider special kinds of preferential models, namely, rational models, to define the semantics of the T
operator, and we use a different notion of preference between models, namely, the preference relation <FIMS , introduced in
Section 2.3. Given the typicality operator, the typical assertion T(C) ⊑ D (all the typical C ’s are D ’s) plays the role of the
conditional assertion C |∼ D in R. We show that the correspondence result established by Theorem 2 can be lifted from the
propositional calculus to ALC .
3.1. The logicALC + TR
In order to apply rational closure to DLs we proceed in two steps. First, similarly to [17], we extend the standard ALC
by a typicality operator T that allows to single out the typical instances of a concept. Since we are dealing here with rational
closure (that builds over R), we attribute to T properties related to R. The resulting logic is called ALC + TR . As a second
step, we build over ALC + TR a rational closure mechanism.
Our starting point is therefore the extension of logic ALC with a typicality operator T: we allow concepts of the form
T(C), whose intuitive meaning is that T(C) selects the typical instances of a concept C . We can therefore distinguish between
the properties that hold for all instances of concept C (C ⊑ D), and those that only hold for the typical such instances
(T(C)⊑ D).
Definition 12. We consider an alphabet of concept names C , of role names R, and of individual constants O. Given A ∈ C
and R ∈R, we define:
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CR := A | ⊤ | ⊥ | ¬CR | CR ⊓ CR | CR ⊔ CR | ∀R.CR | ∃R.CR
CL := CR | T(CR)
A knowledge base is a pair (TBox, ABox). TBox contains a finite set of concept inclusions CL ⊑ CR . ABox contains assertions
of the form CL(a) and R(a,b), where a,b ∈O.
The semantics of ALC + TR can be formulated in terms of rational models: ordinary models of ALC are equipped with
a preference relation < on the domain, whose intuitive meaning is to compare the “typicality” of domain elements, that is to
say x< y means that x is more typical than y. Typical members of a concept C , that is members of T(C), are the members
x of C that are minimal with respect to this preference relation (s.t. there is no other member of C more typical than x).
Definition 13 (Semantics ofALC + TR). A model M of ALC + TR is any structure 〈1,<, I〉 where:
• 1 is the domain;
• < is an irreflexive, transitive and modular (if x< y then either x< z or z< y) relation over 1;
• I is the extension function that maps each concept C to C I ⊆1, and each role R to R I ⊆1×1. For concepts of ALC ,
C I is defined in the usual way. For the T operator, we have
(T(C))I =Min<(C
I ),
where Min<(S)= {u : u ∈ S and ∄z ∈ S s.t. z< u}.
Furthermore, < satisfies the Well-Foundedness Condition, i.e., for all S ⊆1, for all x ∈ S , either x ∈Min<(S) or ∃y ∈Min<(S)
such that y < x.3
The semantics with one single preference relation < is the one that, as we will show, corresponds to rational closure.
One may think of considering a sharper semantics with several preference relations, we briefly discuss this variant in the
last section.
An alternative equivalent semantics of the T operator by means of a set of postulates that are essentially a reformulation
of axioms and rules of nonmonotonic entailment in rational logic R can be found in Appendix A, together with the proof of
the equivalence.
Definition 14 (Model satisfying a knowledge base). Given an ALC + TR model M= 〈1,<, I〉, we assume that I is extended
to assign a domain element aI of 1 to each individual constant a of O. We say that:
• a model M satisfies an inclusion C ⊑ D (written M |HALC+TR C ⊑ D) if it holds C
I ⊆ D I ;
• M satisfies an assertion C(a) (written M |HALC+TR C(a)) if a
I ∈ C I and M satisfies an assertion R(a,b) (written
M |HALC+TR R(a,b)) if (a
I ,b I ) ∈ R I .
Given a knowledge base K = (TBox,ABox), we say that:
• M satisfies TBox if M satisfies all inclusions in TBox (written M |HALC+TR TBox);
• M satisfies ABox if M satisfies all assertions in ABox (written M |HALC+TR ABox);
• M satisfies K if it satisfies both its TBox and its ABox (written M |HALC+TR K );
• a concept C is satisfiable with respect to K , if there is a model M= 〈1,<, I〉 satisfying K and such that C I 6= ∅.
It is worth noticing that, as a difference with our previous approach in [23], here we do not assume the unique name
assumption, that is to say we do not assume that, in a model M, I is extended to assign a distinct element aI of 1 to
each individual constant a of O. In [23], UNA is needed since the properties of the preference relation < are built from
preferential logic P: in that case, the unique name assumption avoids that models in which two names are mapped into the
same individual of the domain are preferred to those in which they are mapped into distinct ones. This is needed in order
to perform useful reasoning about two different individuals named in the ABox. As we will see in Definition 23 below, we
restrict our concern to the only case of an FIMS semantics based on the minimization of ranks, therefore the unique name
assumption is no longer needed.
By a construction similar to that used in Theorem 2.3 of [17] for the weaker logic ALC + T, we can prove the following
theorem. The proofs and further details are provided in the technical report [25].
3 Observe that, although in [17,23] we have called the above condition Smoothness condition, this condition is stronger than the smoothness condition
introduced in the propositional case (Definition 1). Indeed, the condition above considers all subsets S of 1 and does not only apply to the interpretations
C I of the concepts C of the language. It is easy to prove that such a condition is equivalent to require that (1,<) is well-founded, i.e. there is no infinite
descending chain of individuals. In the following, we keep the same condition as in previous work, but we call it well-foundedness condition.
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Theorem 5 (Complexity ofALC + TR). Given anALC + TR knowledge base K = (TBox,ABox), the problem of deciding satisfiability
of K is ExpTime-complete.
The finite model property of ALC + TR follows as an easy consequence of the terminating tableau construction in
Section 4.1 of [16].
Theorem 6 (Finite model property forALC + TR). Given a knowledge base K , if it is satisfiable inALC + TR then there exists a finite
ALC + TR model satisfying K , i.e.ALC + TR has the finite model property.
Let us define the derivability of an inclusion and of an assertion in ALC + TR:
Definition 15. Given a knowledge base K , an inclusion CL ⊑ CR and an assertion CL(a), with a ∈O, we say that:
• the inclusion CL ⊑ CR is entailed from K , written K |HALC+TR CL ⊑ CR , if CL
I ⊆ CR
I holds in all models M= 〈1,<, I〉
satisfying K ;
• the assertion CL(a) is entailed from K , written K |HALC+TR CL(a), if a
I ∈ CL
I holds in all models M= 〈1,<, I〉 satisfy-
ing K .
As usual, when, for a given knowledge base K and a concept C , it holds that K 6|HALC+TR C ⊑ ⊥ we say that C is
satisfiable with respect to K .
As an easy consequence of Theorem 6, we prove the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Given a knowledge base K and a concept C satisfiable with respect to K , then there exists a finite ALC + TR model
M= 〈1,<, I〉 satisfying K , such that C I 6= ∅.
Proof. Let K = (TBox,ABox) and let us assume that C is satisfiable with respect to K . Then there is a model M= 〈1,<, I〉
satisfying K such that C I 6= ∅. Let x ∈ C I , let d be a new individual name not occurring in K and let K ′ = (TBox,ABox′),
where ABox′ = ABox∪ {C(d)}. Clearly, K ′ is satisfiable, as the model obtained from M by letting dI = x satisfies K ′ . By the
finite model property (Theorem 6) there exists a finite model satisfying K ′ . Let M′ be such a model. M′ is a finite model
of K such that C I
′
6= ∅. 2
As for propositional rational models, finite ALC + TR models (to which we can restrict attention by Theorem 6) can be
equivalently defined by postulating the existence of a function kM :1 7−→N, where kM assigns a finite rank to each world,
and is defined as follows.
Definition 16 (Rank of a domain element kM(x)). Given a model M= 〈1,<, I〉, the rank kM of a domain element x ∈1, is
the length of the longest chain x0 < . . . < x from x to a minimal x0 (i.e. such that there is no x
′ such that x′ < x0).
As for the propositional case, the rank function kM and < can be defined from each other by letting x< y if and only
if kM(x) < kM(y).
Definition 17 (Rank of a concept kM(CR) in a model). Given a model M = 〈1,<, I〉, the rank kM(CR) of a concept CR in the
modelM is defined as
kM(CR)=min{kM(x) | x ∈ CR
I }.
If CR
I = ∅, then CR has no rank and we write kM(CR)=∞.
It is immediate to verify that:
Proposition 11. For anyM= 〈1,<, I〉, we have thatM satisfies T(C)⊑ D if and only if kM(C ⊓ D) < kM(C ⊓¬D).
As already mentioned, although the typicality operator T itself is nonmonotonic (i.e. T(C) ⊑ D does not imply
T(C ⊓ E) ⊑ D), the logic ALC + TR is monotonic: what is inferred from K can still be inferred from any K
′ with
K ⊆ K ′ . This is a clear limitation in DLs. As a consequence of the monotonicity of ALC + TR , one cannot deal with ir-
relevance, for instance. So one cannot derive from K = {Penguin ⊑ Bird,T(Bird) ⊑ Fly,T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly} that K |HALC+TR
T(Penguin⊓ Black)⊑¬Fly, even if the property of being black is irrelevant with respect to flying. In the same way, if we add
to K the information that Jim is a bird (Bird(jim)), in ALC+TR one cannot tentatively derive, in the absence of information
to the contrary, that it is a typical bird and therefore it flies (T(Bird)(jim) and Fly(jim)).
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In the following section we investigate the possibility of overcoming this weakness by extending to ALC+TR the notion
of rational closure. As we will see, this extension allows to deal with irrelevance and allows to attribute typical properties
to individuals.
3.2. Rational closure of the TBox inALC + TR
In this section, we extend to ALC + TR the definition of rational closure introduced by Lehmann and Magidor for the
propositional case.
We first consider the rational closure with respect to TBox, in which essentially we only consider which concept inclu-
sions belong to the rational closure of K. Next we will consider rational closure with respect to ABox, in which we consider
the individuals explicitly named in the Abox, and derive their properties.
Let us first define the notion of query: a query is either an inclusion relation or an assertion of the ABox; we want to
check whether it is entailed from a given knowledge base.
Definition 18 (Query). A query F is either an assertion CL(a) or an inclusion relation CL ⊑ CR . Given a model M= 〈1,<, I〉,
a query F holds in M if M satisfies F , i.e. if aI ∈ (CL(a))
I or C IL ⊆ C
I
R , respectively.
4
Definition 19 (Exceptionality of concepts and inclusions). Let K = (TBox,ABox) be a knowledge base. A concept C is said to
be exceptional for K if and only if K |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑ ¬C . A T-inclusion T(C)⊑ D is exceptional for K if C is exceptional
for K . The set of T-inclusions of K which are exceptional in K will be denoted as E(K ).
Note that, differently from Lehmann and Magidor’s notion of exceptionality in Section 2.2, the exceptionality of a concept
is defined also taking into account the ABox. This is needed when the ABox contains typicality assertions of the form T(C)(a).
Indeed, as we will see later with an example, the construction of the rational closure of the TBox of a knowledge base K is
affected by the presence of typicality assertions in the ABox: if the assertions T(C)(a) and ¬D(a) are in the ABox, it is not
the case that all the typical C ’s are D ’s, so that the defeasible inclusion T(C)⊑ D does not hold.
Similarly to the propositional case, in the following we introduce a sequence of knowledge bases, starting from the initial
one, K , in order to iteratively use exceptionality in the construction of the rational closure. At each step, in order to reason
about the following exceptional subset of K , we remove the inclusions T(C)⊑ D of K that are not exceptional for K . Before
we do this, if there is an assertion T(C)(a) in ABox, we add to a all the typical properties of C that we are removing. Because
we want to reason in the same way for equivalent concepts, this leads us to the slightly more complicated formulation of
ABoxi below.
Definition 20. Given a DL knowledge base K = (TBox,ABox), it is possible to define a sequence of knowledge bases
E0, . . . , E i, . . . , En by letting E0 = (TBox0,ABox0) where TBox0 = TBox and ABox0 = ABox and, for i > 0, E i = (TBoxi,ABoxi)
where
• TBoxi = E(E i−1)∪ {C ⊑ D ∈ TBox | T does not occur in C}
• ABoxi = ABoxi−1 ∪ {(¬C ⊔ D)(a) | T(C) ⊑ D in (E i−1 − E i) and there is a T(B)(a) ∈ ABox such that E i−1 6|HALC+TR
T(⊤)⊑¬B and E j |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬B for all j < i − 1}
(as a consequence of the next Definition 21, these are the Bs such that rank(B)= i − 1).
Clearly TBox0 ⊇ TBox1 ⊇ TBox2, . . . , while ABox0 ⊆ ABox1 ⊆ ABox2, . . .
Observe that, being K finite, there is a least n ≥ 0 such that, for all m > n, TBoxm = TBoxn or TBoxm = ∅. We take
(TBoxn,ABoxn) as the last element of the sequence of knowledge bases starting from K . Observe also that the definition of
the TBoxi ’s is the same as the definition of the C i ’s in Lehmann and Magidor’s definition of rational closure in Section 2.2,
except for the fact that here, at each step, we also add all the “strict” inclusions C ⊑ D (where T does not occur in C ).
Informally, for the definition of ABoxi , if T(B)(a) ∈ ABox (i.e., a is a typical B-element), and B has rank i − 1, then, for
all the inclusions T(C)⊑ D in (E i−1 − E i), since C has also rank i − 1 we have that: if a is a C-element, then it is a typical
C-element and the assertion (¬C ⊔ D)(a) must hold.
Note that, when the ABox does not contain typicality assertions of the form T(C)(a), we have that, for all i, ABoxi =
ABox. In this case, ABoxi is irrelevant to determine the exceptionality of concepts as E i |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬C if and only if
TBoxi |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬C , for all concepts C . As in this case the definition of exceptionality of concepts does not depend
4 The notion of query we have just defined does not consider the case of querying about role instances, that is to say of the form R(a,b), where R
is a role name and a,b are individual names occurring in the ABox. The reason is that in ALC + TR , like in the basic ALC, for any knowledge base
K = TBox ∪ ABox, and any role instance R(a,b) as above, it holds that if K is satisfiable, then K |HALC+TR R(a,b) if and only if R(a,b) ∈ ABox (if K is not
satisfiable everything follows), thus neither the logic ALC + TR , nor the rational closure construction add any inferential power. This of course would not
necessarily be true in extensions of ALC containing for instance role constructors.
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on the ABox, the construction above can be simplified, by taking E0 = TBox and E i = TBoxi , and evaluating exceptionality
only with respect to the TBox. Hence, we can avoid the computation of the ABoxis and the construction becomes quite
similar to the one of Lehmann and Magidor recalled in Section 2.2. This simplified construction can be found in [24].
Definition 21 (Rank of a concept). A concept C has rank i (denoted by rank(C)= i) for K = (TBox,ABox), if and only if i is
the least natural number for which C is not exceptional for E i . If C is exceptional for all E i then rank(C)=∞, and we say
that C has no rank.
Consider the least n≥ 0 such that, for all m> n, TBoxm = TBoxn or TBoxm = ∅. Then from the above definition it follows
that if a concept C has a rank, its highest possible value is n. As for propositional logic, the notion of rank of a formula
allows to define the rational closure of a knowledge base K with respect to TBox.
Definition 22 (Rational closure of TBox). Let K = (TBox,ABox) be a DL knowledge base. We define TBox, the rational closure of
TBox, as
TBox= {T(C)⊑ D | either rank(C) < rank(C ⊓¬D) or rank(C)=∞} ∪ {C ⊑ D | K |HALC+TR C ⊑ D}
It can be easily seen that the rational closure of TBox is a nonmonotonic strengthening of ALC + TR . For instance, it
allows to deal with irrelevance, as the following example shows.
Example 6. Let K = (TBox,ABox) where ABox = ∅ and TBox = {Penguin ⊑ Bird,T(Bird) ⊑ Fly,T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly}. It can be
verified that T(Bird ⊓ Black) ⊑ Fly ∈ TBox. This is a nonmonotonic inference that does no longer follow if we know that
typical black birds do not fly: given TBox′ = TBox ∪ {T(Bird ⊓ Black) ⊑ ¬Fly}, we have that T(Bird ⊓ Black) ⊑ Fly /∈ TBox′ .
Similarly, as for the propositional case, rational closure is closed under rational monotonicity: from T(Bird)⊑ Fly ∈ TBox and
T(Bird)⊑¬LivesEurope /∈ TBox it follows that T(Bird ⊓ LivesEurope)⊑ Fly ∈ TBox.
We can show that the presence of typicality assertions in the ABox has an impact on the construction of the rational
closure.
Example 7. Let K = (TBox,ABox), where TBox is as in Example 6 and ABox= {T(Bird⊓ Black)(opus),¬Fly(opus)}. As opus is a
typical black bird and it does not fly, it is clear the we are no longer ready to accept that typical black birds fly, otherwise we
get an inconsistency with the ABox. Indeed, using the construction of rational closure given above, we have that K |HALC+TR
T(⊤)⊑¬(Bird⊓ Black), so that rank(Bird⊓ Black) 6= 0. In particular, rank(Bird⊓ Black)= 1 and rank(Bird⊓ Black⊓¬Fly)= 1 as
well. Hence, T(Bird ⊓ Black)⊑ Fly /∈ TBox.
The next example shows that a sequence of ABoxes in the construction of the rational closure is actually needed.
Example 8. Let K = (TBox,ABox) where TBox = {Penguin ⊑ Bird,T(Bird) ⊑ Fly,T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly,T(Bird) ⊑ ∀HasFriend.Fly}
and ABox= {T(Bird)(opus),HasFriend(opus,pio),T(Penguin ⊓ Violet)(pio)}.
From the construction in Definition 20, we have:
• TBox0 = {Penguin⊑ Bird,T(Bird)⊑ Fly,T(Penguin)⊑¬Fly,T(Bird)⊑ ∀HasFriend.Fly},
ABox0 = {T(Bird)(opus),HasFriend(opus,pio),T(Penguin ⊓ Violet)(pio)}.
• TBox1 = {Penguin⊑ Bird,T(Penguin)⊑¬Fly},
ABox1 = {T(Bird)(opus),HasFriend(opus,pio),T(Penguin⊓Violet)(pio), (¬Bird ⊔ Fly)(opus), (¬Bird⊔ ∀HasFriend.Fly)(opus)}.
• TBox2 = {Penguin⊑ Bird},
ABox2 = {T(Bird)(opus),HasFriend(opus,pio),T(Penguin⊓Violet)(pio), (¬Bird ⊔ Fly)(opus), (¬Bird⊔ ∀HasFriend.Fly)(opus)}.
Observe that the last two assertions in ABox1 have been introduced as T(Bird)(opus) ∈ ABox, and Bird is not exceptional
in E0 . Observe also that E1 |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬(Penguin ⊓ Violet) and the assertion (¬Bird ⊔ ∀HasFriend.Fly)(opus) in ABox1
is needed to infer that pio flies and hence, although it is a typical violet penguin, pio cannot be a typical penguin.
We get rank(Penguin ⊓ Violet) = 2, while rank(Penguin) = 1, and rank(Bird) = 0. Hence, we can conclude that typical
penguins are not violet, T(Penguin)⊑¬Violet ∈ TBox, as rank(Penguin) < rank(Penguin ⊓ Violet).
So far we have extended to ALC+TR the syntactic notion of rational closure. We wonder whether we provide a semantic
characterization of this notion by extending the semantic characterization given at the propositional level.
As for the propositional case (in the case of FIMS), in order to semantically characterize the rational closure, we first
restrict our attention to minimal rational models that minimize the rank of domain elements. Informally, given two models
of K , one in which a given domain element x has rank 2 (because for instance z < y < x), and another in which it has
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rank 1 (because only y < x), we prefer the latter, as in this model the element x is assumed to be “more typical” than in
the former.
Definition 23 (Minimal models). Given M = 〈1,<, I〉 and M′ = 〈1′,<′, I ′〉 we say that M is preferred to M′ (M <FIMS
M′) if:
• 1=1′
• C I = C I
′
for all concepts C
• for all x ∈1, it holds that kM(x)≤ kM′ (x) whereas there exists y ∈1 such that kM(y) < kM′ (y).
Given a knowledge base K , we say that M is a minimal model of K with respect to <FIMS if it is a model satisfying K and
there is no M′ model satisfying K such that M′ <FIMS M.
It is worth noticing that roles are not considered in Definition 23, in other words, they are allowed to vary in the
proposed preferential semantics. Subsequently, as for the propositional case, we restrict our attention to minimal canonical
models. We define S as the set of all the concepts (and subconcepts) occurring in K or in the query F together with their
complements (observe that S is finite).
In order to define canonical models, we consider all the sets of concepts {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ S that are consistent with K ,
i.e., s.t. K 6|HALC+TR C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn ⊑⊥.
Definition 24 (Canonical model with respect to S). Given K = (TBox,ABox) and a query F , a model M= 〈1,<, I〉 satisfying
K is canonical with respect to S if, for each set of concepts {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ S consistent with K , there exists (at least) a
domain element x ∈1 such that x ∈ (C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn)
I .
The intuition is that a canonical model contains all the individuals that enjoy properties that are consistent with the
knowledge base. This is needed when reasoning about the (relative) rank of the concepts: it is important to have them
all represented. As we will see in Theorem 7, in ALC the existence of a canonical model is guaranteed for any consistent
knowledge base. However, this may be not true for more expressive logics and, in particular, this is not true for SHOIQ
[28] (see Example 4 in [27]).
Next we define the notion of minimal canonical model.
Definition 25 (Minimal canonical models (with respect to TBox)). M is a minimal canonical model of K if it satisfies K , it is
minimal (with respect to Definition 23) and it is canonical (according to Definition 24).
We can now prove the following:
Theorem 7. For any consistent knowledge base K , there exists a finite, minimal canonical model of K with respect to TBox.
Proof. Let M= 〈1,<, I〉 be a finite model of K (which exists by the finite model property, since K is consistent), and let
{C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ S be any subset of S consistent with K . We show that we can expand M in order to obtain a finite
model of K that contains an instance of C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn . By repeating the same construction for all maximal consistent
subsets {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} of S , we eventually obtain a finite canonical model of K .
Indeed, for each {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} consistent with K , it holds that K 6|HALC+TR C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . .⊓ Cn ⊑⊥, i.e. concept C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓
. . . ⊓ Cn is satisfiable with respect to K . By Corollary 2 there exists a finite ALC + TR model M
′ = 〈1′,<′, I ′〉 satisfying K ,
such that (C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn)
I ′ 6= ∅.
Let M′ ∗ be the union of M and M′ , i.e. M′ ∗ = 〈1′ ∗,<′ ∗, I ′ ∗〉, where 1′ ∗ =1∪1′ . As far as individuals named in the
ABox are concerned, we define I ′ ∗ as I , that is to say aI
′ ∗
= aI for all a ∈O occurring in ABox. For concepts and roles, I ′ ∗ is
defined as I for elements in 1 and as I ′ on elements in 1′ , that is to say, for all atomic concepts C ∈ C and all roles R ∈R:
• x ∈ C I
′ ∗
for all x ∈1, if x ∈ C I ;
• x ∈ C I
′ ∗
for all x ∈1′ , if x ∈ C I
′
;
• (x, y) ∈ R I
′ ∗
for all x, y ∈1, if (x, y) ∈ R I ;
• (x, y) ∈ R I
′ ∗
for all x, y ∈1′ , if (x, y) ∈ R I
′
.
Also, kM′ ∗ (x)= kM(x) for the elements in x ∈1, and kM′ ∗ (x)= n+ kM′ (x) for all the elements x ∈1
′ , where n is the
maximum value of kM in M (n is finite, as each element of M has a finite rank). <
′ ∗ is straightforwardly defined from
kM′ ∗ by letting x<
′ ∗ y if and only if kM′ ∗ (x) < kM′ ∗ (y). It can be verified that M
′ ∗ is a finite model of K which contains
an instance of C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn . For the inclusions and assertions of K that do not contain T this is obviously true. For the
inclusions containing T, for each T(C)⊑ D , if x ∈Min<′∗(C) in M
′ ∗ , also x ∈Min<(C) in M or x ∈Min<′ (C) in M
′ . In both
cases x is an instance of D (since both M and M′ satisfy K ), therefore x ∈ D I
′ ∗
, and M′ ∗ satisfies K .
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By repeating the same construction for all the (finitely many) maximal consistent subsets {C1,C2, . . . ,Cn} of S , we obtain
a finite canonical model of K , call it M+ . We do not know whether M+ is minimal. Observe that, as the domain 1+ of
M+ is finite, the rank of each element in 1+ is finite. If M+ is not minimal, then there is a model M1 (over the same
domain 1+) preferred to M+ , such that, for all x ∈1+ kM1 (x)≤ kM+ (x) and for some y ∈1
+ kM1 (y) < kM+ (y). Again,
if M1 is not minimal there must be another M2 preferred to M1 . And so on, lowering the ranks. As the domain 1
+ is
finite, this descending chain of models cannot be infinite and, eventually, we reach a minimal canonical model of K . 2
To prove the correspondence between minimal canonical models and the rational closure of a TBox, we need to introduce
some propositions. Given an ALC+TR model M= 〈1,<, I〉, we define a sequence M0 , M1,M2, . . . of models as follows:
We let M0 =M and, for all i, we let Mi = 〈1,<i, I〉 be the ALC + TR model obtained from M by assigning a rank 0 to
all the domain elements x with kM(x)≤ i, i.e., kMi (x)= kM(x)− i if kM(x) > i, and kMi (x)= 0 otherwise.
Proposition 12. Let K = 〈TBox,ABox〉 and letM= 〈1,<, I〉 be a minimal canonicalALC+ TR model satisfying K . For any concept
C , if rank(C)≥ i, then
1) kM(C)≥ i, and
2) Mi satisfies E i .
Proof. By induction on i. For i = 0, 1) holds (since it always holds that kM(C)≥ 0). 2) holds trivially as M0 =M.
For i > 0, 1) holds: if rank(C)≥ i, then, by Definition 21, for all j < i, we have that E j |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬C . By inductive
hypothesis on 2), for all j < i M j |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬C . Hence, for all x with kM(x) < i, x /∈ C
I , and kM(C)≥ i.
To prove 2), we reason as follows. Since TBoxi ⊆ TBox0 , M |HALC+TR TBoxi . Furthermore by definition of rank, for all
T(B) ⊑ D ∈ TBoxi , rank(B) ≥ i, hence by 1) just proved kM(B) ≥ i. Hence, in M, the rank of all elements in Min<(B
I ) is
≥ i, and also Mi |HALC+TR T(B)⊑ D .
To prove that Mi |HALC+TR E i , we also need to show that Mi |HALC+TR ABoxi . By construction, for all the assertions
C(a) ∈ ABox, M |HALC+TR C(a) and there is an element x ∈1 such that x ∈ C
I and aI = x. As Mi only differs from M for
the ranks, if C 6= T(B), Mi |HALC+TR C(a). If C = T(B), as in M it holds that x ∈ (T(B))
I , x is a B-minimal element in M,
and it can be proven that it remains a B-minimal element in Mi . Thus, Mi satisfies T(B)(a).
For each assertion (¬C ⊔ D)(a) ∈ ABoxi such that (¬C ⊔ D)(a) /∈ ABox, we distinguish two cases: either (¬C ⊔
D)(a) ∈ ABoxi−1 or (¬C ⊔ D)(a) /∈ ABoxi−1 . In the first case, by inductive hypothesis, Mi−1 |HALC+TR E i−1 , and hence
Mi−1 |HALC+TR (¬C ⊔ D)(a) and also Mi |HALC+TR (¬C ⊔ D)(a) (since T does not occur in C ). In the second case,
the assertion (¬C ⊔ D)(a) has been added to ABoxi and was not in ABoxi−1 . Hence, there is an inclusion T(C) ⊑ D in
(E i−1 − E i) and there is a T(B)(a) ∈ ABox (and hence in ABoxi) such that E i−1 6|HALC+TR T(⊤) ⊑ ¬B . As T(B)(a) ∈ ABox,
M |HALC+TR T(B)(a) and for some x ∈1, x ∈Min<(B
I ) and x= aI . We want to show that x ∈ (¬C ⊔ D)I , for all T(C)⊑ D
in E i−1 , so that (¬C ⊔ D)(a) is satisfied in Mi−1 and hence in Mi .
By construction, rank(B)= i − 1, and by inductive hypothesis, part 1), kM(B)≥ i − 1. We show that kM(B)= i − 1 and
kMi−1 (B)= 0.
From E i−1 6|HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬B , we know there is a model, M
′′ satisfying E i−1 and such that, for some domain element
y, kM′′ (y)= 0 and y ∈ B
I ′′ . Clearly, for all T(C)⊑ D ∈ TBoxi−1 , y ∈ (¬C ⊔ D)
I ′′ . Let {C1, . . . ,Cr} be the maximal consistent
set of concepts of which y is an instance. We can show that {C1, . . . ,Cr} is consistent with K. Indeed, we can define a new
model of K by adding to M all the domain elements in M′′ , including y, by keeping the interpretation of concepts and
relations on such elements as in M′′ and by letting the rank kM(y) = i − 1 and kM(z) = n + 1 (where n is the highest
rank in M), for all z ∈1′′ such that z 6= y. The obtained model is clearly a model of K satisfying {C1, . . . ,Cr}, which proves
the consistency of this set w.r.t. K .
As M is a canonical model, and {C1, . . . ,Cr} is consistent with K, there must be a y
′ in 1 such that y′ is an instance
of C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr . Furthermore, for all T(C) ⊑ D ∈ TBoxi−1 , y
′ ∈ (¬C ⊔ D)I , and y′ must have rank kM(y
′) = i − 1 (as M is
a minimal model of K ). Hence, kMi−1 (B)= 0, and, since Mi−1 satisfies T(B)(a), it must be kMi−1 (x)= 0 for x= a
I . Thus,
in Mi−1 , if x ∈ C
I , then x ∈ (T (C))I , and from the fact that Mi−1 satisfies T(C)⊑ D , we can conclude that x ∈ D
I . Hence,
x ∈ (¬C ⊔ D)I for x= aI , so that (¬C ⊔ D)(a) is satisfied in Mi−1 . It is easy to see that (¬C ⊔ D)(a) is satisfied in Mi as
well. Therefore Mi |HALC+TR E i . 2
The next proposition is still concerned with minimal canonical models, to prove the correspondence between the rank
of a concept (as in Definition 21) and the rank of a concept in a minimal canonical model (as in Definition 17).
Proposition 13. Given a consistent K and S , for all C ∈ S , if rank(C)= i, then:
(1) there is a {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr} ⊆ S maximal and consistent with K such that C ∈ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr} and rank(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr)= i
(2) for anyM minimal canonical model of K , it holds that kM(C)= i
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Proof. We prove (1). If i = 0, we have that K 6|HALC+TR T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C . Then there is a model M0 of K with a domain
element x such that kM0 (x)= 0 and x is an instance of C . Consider the maximal consistent set of concepts in S of which x
is an instance in M0 . This is a maximal consistent set {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr} ⊆ S containing C . Furthermore, rank(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓
Cr)= 0 since clearly K 6|HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr) (given that kM0 (x)= 0).
For all i > 0 we proceed as follows. We have that E i 6|HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬C , then there must be a model Mi = 〈1i,<i, I i〉
of E i , and a domain element x such that kMi (x) = 0 and x is an instance of C . Consider the maximal consistent set of
concepts {C1, . . . ,Cr} ⊆ S of which x is an instance in Mi . Clearly, C ∈ {C1, . . . ,Cr}. Furthermore, rank(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . .⊓ Cr)= i.
Indeed E i−1 |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr) (since E i−1 |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬C and C ∈ {C1, . . . ,Cr}), whereas clearly
by the existence of x, E i 6|HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr).
We have to prove that the set {C1, . . . ,Cr} is consistent with K . The proof is the same for i = 0 and for i > 0. Let
Mi = 〈1i,<i, I i〉 be the model, considered few lines above in this proof, such that x ∈ 1i is an instance of C . Starting
from a finite model M= 〈1,<, I〉 of K (M exists by the finite model property, Theorem 6), we add to M all the domain
elements of Mi .
We define the resulting model M′ = 〈1′,<′, I ′〉 as follows: 1′ = 1 ∪ 1i ; I
′ is defined on the elements of 1 as I
in M, and on the elements of 1i as I i in Mi . For the interpretation of concepts: for x ∈1, x ∈ C
I ′ if and only if x ∈ C I ;
for x ∈1i , x ∈ C
I ′ if and only if x ∈ C I i . For the interpretation of roles: for x, y ∈1, (x, y) ∈ R I
′
if and only if (x, y) ∈ R I ; for
x, y ∈1i , (x, y) ∈ R
I ′ if and only if (x, y) ∈ R I i ; and, for any two elements x ∈1 and y ∈1i , (x, y) /∈ R
I ′ and (y, x) /∈ R I
′
.
For all individual constants a ∈O, we let aI
′
= aI . Finally, for all w ∈1, we let kM′ (w)= kM(w) and, for all y ∈1i , we let
kM′ (y)= n+ 1+ kMi (y), where n is the highest value of kM in M (n is finite as each element in M has a finite rank).
We can show that by construction the resulting model satisfies K . Let C ⊑ D be an inclusion in TBox. We distinguish
two cases: C does not contain the typicality operator and C = T (B) for some B . In the first case, C ⊆ D is a strict inclusion.
Let x ∈ C I
′
. There are two cases: either x ∈ 1 or x ∈ 1i . In the first case, x ∈ C
I in M. As M satisfies K , x ∈ D I and, by
definition of M′ , x ∈ D I
′
. In the second case, x ∈ C I i . As Mi satisfies all the strict inclusions in K (which belong to E i),
x ∈ D I i and, by definition of M′ , x ∈ D I
′
.
In case C = T (B) for some B , observe that if x ∈ (T(B))I
′
, then either x ∈1 or x ∈1i . In the first case, x is B-minimal
in M and x ∈ D I . Hence, by definition of M′ , x ∈ D I
′
. In the second case, x is B-minimal in Mi and x ∈ D
I i . Hence, by
definition of M′ , x ∈ D I
′
.
Observe that all the assertions in the ABox are satisfied in M and we have interpreted individual constants over the
elements of 1 as in M: aI
′
= aI , for all a ∈O. By construction, for x ∈1, x ∈ C I
′
iff x ∈ C I . Hence, if B(a) ∈ ABox is satisfied
in M, then it is satisfied in M′ as well.
From this, we can conclude that M′ is a model satisfying K and (C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr)
I ′ 6= ∅. From this, point (1) follows.
Let us prove point (2). By point (1), if rank(C) = i there is a {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr} ⊆ S maximal and consistent with K
containing C and such that rank(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr) = i. By Definition 24, we know that in all canonical models there
is at least an instance of (C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr). To prove point (2) we show that in all minimal canonical models M
of K , kM(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr) = i, which entails kM(C) = i (since C ∈ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr}). By Proposition 12 we know
that kM(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr) ≥ i. We need to show that also kM(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr) ≤ i. For a contradiction suppose
kM(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr) > i, i.e., for all the domain elements x instances of C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr , kM(x) > i. We show that this
contradicts the minimality of M. From M we build another model M′ = 〈1′,<′, I ′〉 of K by lowering the ranks of some el-
ements in M and leaving all the rest unchanged. We let 1′ =1 and I ′ = I . For each element y ∈1, let {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr} ⊆ S
be the maximal set of concepts consistent with K of which y is an instance. If rank(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr)= i < kM(y), we let
kM′ (y)= i. Otherwise, we let kM′ (y)= kM(y). Observe that we can obtain M
′ from the model M by repeatedly lowering
the rank of the elements in 1 rank by rank, starting from rank i = 0.
M′ would still be a model of TBox: at each step, when the rank of an element y is lowered to i (together with all the
other elements whose rank is lowered to i), the only thing that changes with respect to M is that y might have become
in M′ a minimal instance of a concept of which it was only a non-typical instance in M. This might compromise the
satisfaction in M′ of a typicality inclusion as T(E)⊑ G . We show that this cannot happen by reasoning by induction on i
to prove that, after lowering the rank of an element y in 1, the modified model still satisfies all the inclusions in K . Let
rank(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr)= i < kM(y), consider a step in which we let kM′ (y)= i.
For i = 0, let T(E)⊑ G ∈ K . It can be easily proven that being rank(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . .⊓ Cr)= 0, then if E ∈ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr} also
G ∈ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr} (indeed if on the contrary ¬G ∈ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr}, then clearly K |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr),
against the hypothesis that rank(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr)= 0). Therefore if y ∈ E
I ′ , also y ∈ G I
′
, and T(E)⊑ G holds in M′ .
For i > 0, let T(E)⊑ G ∈ K . We consider two cases: rank(E)≥ i and rank(E) < i. If rank(E)≥ i we reason as above (with
E i instead of K and i instead of 0) to conclude that if E ∈ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr} also G ∈ {C1,C2, . . . ,Cr}, hence if y ∈ E
I ′ , also
y ∈ G I
′
, and T(E)⊑ G holds in M′ . If rank(E) < i, then rank(E)≤ i−1, and we know by construction that kM′ (E) < i and y
is not a minimal instance of E in M′ . Hence lowering the rank of y does not compromise the satisfaction of T(E)⊑ G ∈ E i .
The resulting M′ is such that for all maximal set of concepts consistent with K , {C1, . . . ,Cr}, kM′ (C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr) =
rank(C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr ). Furthermore, by the above reasoning, M
′ satisfies TBox. We show that M′ also satisfies ABox, and in
particular it is not the case that a T(B)(a) ∈ ABox might turn false in M′ .
For all assertions T(B)(a) ∈ ABox, from the hypothesis we know that M satisfies T(B)(a). Hence, there is a z ∈1 such
that aI = z and z ∈ (T (B))I . We show that it must be the case that z ∈ (T (B))I
′
and, therefore, T(B)(a) is satisfied in
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M′ as well. Let {C1, . . . ,Cr} be the maximal consistent set of concepts of which z is an instance in M. We prove that,
rank(C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr)= rank(B).
Clearly rank(C1 ⊓ . . .Cr)≥ rank(B) (since B ∈ {C1, . . . ,Cr}). Suppose for a contradiction that rank(C1 ⊓ . . .⊓ Cr) > rank(B),
i.e. there is an E i s.t. E i 6|HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑ ¬B but E i |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑ ¬(C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Ck). Take the minimal i for which this
happens, we show a contradiction. As T(B)(a) ∈ ABox, for all T(C) ⊑ D ∈ E i , (¬C ⊔ D)(a) has been added to ABoxi . We
know by Proposition 12 that Mi satisfies E i and, in particular, it satisfies ABoxi . Thus Mi |HALC+TR (¬C ⊔ D)(a), and
z ∈ (¬C ⊔ D)I , for all T(C)⊑ D ∈ E i . As M is a minimal model, it must be the case that kM(z)= i (otherwise we can define
a canonical model M′′ such that M′′ <FIMS M). Therefore, kMi (z)= 0 and, as Mi satisfies E i , Mi is a model of E i such
that kMi (C1 ⊓ . . .⊓ Ck)= 0, thus contradicting the fact that E i |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬(C1 ⊓ . . .⊓ Ck). Hence, rank(C1 ⊓ . . .⊓ Cr)=
rank(B).
As by the construction of M′ , it must be that kM′ (a
I ′ )= rank(C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr). To conclude that z ∈ (T(B))
I ′ , observe that
it is not possible that there is an element y ∈ B I
′
such that kM′ (y) < kM′ (a
I ′ ). In fact, otherwise it would be: kM′ (y) <
rank(B), which contradicts Proposition 12, point (1). This concludes the proof that M′ satisfies ABox.
It follows that M′ would be a model of K , and M′ <FIMS M, against the minimality of M. We are therefore forced to
conclude that kM(C1 ⊓ C2 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cr)= i, hence also kM(C)= i, and 2) holds. 2
As a consequence of Proposition 13 and by what we know about the highest rank of a concept (in case it has a rank) we
state the following proposition.
Proposition 14. Let us consider the least n ≥ 0 such that, for allm> n, TBoxm = TBoxn or TBoxm = ∅. Then, in all minimal canonical
modelsM, for all domain elements x, kM(x)≤ n.
We can now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 8. Let K = (TBox,ABox) be a knowledge base and C ⊑ D a query. We have that C ⊑ D ∈ TBox if and only if C ⊑ D holds in
all minimal canonical models of K with respect to TBox.
Proof. (If part) Assume that C ⊑ D holds in all minimal canonical models of K with respect to TBox, and let M= 〈1,<, I〉
be a minimal canonical model of K satisfying C ⊑ D . Observe that C and D (and their complements) belong to S . We
consider two cases: (1) the left hand side of the inclusion C does not contain the typicality operator, and (2) the left hand
side of the inclusion is T(C).
In case (1), the minimal canonical model M of K satisfies C ⊑ D . Then, C I ⊆ D I . For a contradiction, let us assume
that C ⊑ D /∈ TBox. Then, by definition of TBox, it must be: K 6|HALC+TR C ⊑ D . Hence, K 6|HALC+TR C ⊓ ¬D ⊑ ⊥, and the
set of concepts {C,¬D} is consistent with K . As M is a canonical model of K , there must be an element x ∈1 such that
x ∈ (C ⊓¬D)I . This contradicts the fact that C I ⊆ D I .
In case (2), assume M satisfies T(C) ⊑ D . Then, T(C)I ⊆ D I , i.e., for each x ∈ Min<(C
I ), x ∈ D I . If Min<(C
I ) = ∅, then
there is no x ∈ C I (by the smoothness condition), hence C has no rank kM in M and, by Proposition 13, C has no rank
(rank(C)=∞). In this case, by Definition 22, T(C)⊑ D ∈ TBox. Otherwise, let us assume that kM(C)= i. Since M satisfies
T(C)⊑ D , kM(C ⊓ D) < kM(C ⊓¬D), then kM(C ⊓¬D) > i. By Proposition 13, rank(C)= i and rank(C ⊓¬D) > i. Hence, by
Definition 22, T(C)⊑ D ∈ TBox.
(Only if part) If C ⊑ D ∈ TBox, then, by definition of TBox, K |HALC+TR C ⊑ D . Therefore, each minimal canonical model
M of K satisfies C ⊑ D .
If T(C)⊑ D ∈ TBox, then by Definition 22, either (a) rank(C) < rank(C ⊓¬D), or (b) C has no rank. Let M be any minimal
canonical model of K . In the case (a), by Proposition 13, kM(C) < kM(C ⊓ ¬D), which entails kM(C ⊓ D) < kM(C ⊓ ¬D).
Hence M satisfies T(C)⊑ D . In case (b), by Proposition 13, C has no rank in M, hence M satisfies T(C)⊑ D . 2
For a strict inclusion C ⊑ D the problem of deciding whether C ⊑ D ∈ TBox is clearly in ExpTime as, by definition
of TBox (Definition 22), it amounts to check whether K |HALC+TR C ⊑ D (Theorem 5). The problem of deciding whether
T(C)⊑ D ∈ TBox is in ExpTime as well.
Theorem 9 (Complexity of rational closure over the TBox). Given a knowledge base K = (TBox,ABox), the problem of deciding whether
T(C)⊑ D ∈ TBox is in ExpTime.
Proof. Checking if T(C)⊑ D ∈ TBox can be done by computing the finite sequence TBox0,TBox1, . . . ,TBoxn of non-increasing
subsets of TBox inclusions and the sequence ABox0,ABox1, . . . ,ABoxn of non-decreasing supersets of ABox in the construc-
tion of the rational closure. Note that the number n of the TBoxi (and ABoxi ) is O (|K |), where |K | is the size of the
knowledge base K .
Computing each TBoxi = E(TBoxi−1), requires to check, for all concepts C
′ occurring on the left hand side of a T-inclusion
in the TBox, whether TBoxi−1 |HALC+TR T(⊤) ⊑ ¬C
′ , which requires an exponential time [25] in the size of TBoxi−1 (and
hence in the size of K ). The number of the concepts C ′ to be considered is O (|K |).
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Computing each ABoxi requires to check whether E i−1 6|HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑¬B which requires an exponential time in the
size of Ei−1 (and hence in the size of K ).
If not already checked, the exceptionality of C and of C ⊓¬D have to be checked for each TBoxi , to determine the ranks
of C and of C ⊓ ¬D (which also requires an exponential time in the size of K ). Hence, verifying if T(C) ⊑ D ∈ TBox is in
ExpTime. 2
The above result provides an ExpTime upper bound for deciding whether T(C) ⊑ D ∈ TBox (the ExpTime lower bound
comes from the fact that subsumption in ALC is ExpTime-hard). It requires a quadratic (in the size of K ) number of calls to
an ExpTime algorithm for checking subsumption in ALC + TR . In the case the ABox does not contain typicality assertions,
it is possible to see that subsumption in ALC+ TR can be polynomially reduced to subsumption in ALC so that optimized
ALC prover can be used to this purpose. The encoding is the same as the one introduced in [26] for reducing subsumption
in SHIQRT to subsumption in SHIQ (see [26], Proposition 3).
To conclude the session, we want to observe that our definition of exceptionality (Definition 19), which exploits pref-
erential entailment, cannot be equivalently replaced with a notion of exceptionality which directly exploits entailment in
ALC over the materialization of the KB, in the spirit of the other proposals of rational closure in [8,7]. In particular, con-
sider a knowledge base K = (TBox,ABox) and let K S = {A ⊑ B | A ⊑ B ∈ TBox} be the set of strict inclusions in K and
K˜D =⊓ {¬A ⊔ B | T(A)⊑ B ∈ TBox} be the materialization of the defeasible inclusions in K. One can wonder whether the
following notion of exceptionality: “B is exceptional with respect to K if and only if (K S ,ABox) |HALC K˜D ⊑¬B” is equivalent to
the notion of exceptionality introduced in Definition 19. The next example shows that this is not the case at least in the
context of our rational closure construction (Definition 20).
Example 9. Let K = (TBox,ABox) where TBox = {Faun ⊑ ∃HasFriend.WingedHorse,T(WingedHorse) ⊑ Fly,T(WingedHorse) ⊑
¬Fly} and ABox= ∅.
From the construction in Definition 20, we have that ABoxm = ABox and TBoxm = TBox, for all m, as WingedHorse is
exceptional for K , that is, K |HALC+TR T(⊤)⊑ ¬WingedHorse. Furthermore, Faun is exceptional for K (that is, K |HALC+TR
T(⊤)⊑¬Faun) and is exceptional for all the E i = (ABoxi,TBoxi) in the construction. Hence rank(Faun)=∞. Observe that, in
ALC + TR , any model M satisfying K contains neither a WingedHorse nor a Faun-element, i.e., K |HALC+TR WingedHorse⊑
⊥, K |HALC+TR Faun ⊑ ⊥ and, of course, also K |HALC+TR T(Faun) ⊑ ⊥. Therefore, T(Faun) ⊑ ⊥ holds in all the minimal
canonical models of K and this is in accordance with the fact that, being rank(Faun) =∞, T(Faun) ⊑ ⊥ is in the rational
closure of TBox.
If we adopt the definition of exceptionality introduced just above, we get a different result. We have: K S = {Faun ⊑
∃HasFriend.WingedHorse} and K˜D = ((¬WingedHorse ⊔ Fly) ⊓ (¬WingedHorse ⊔ ¬Fly)), therefore
K S |HALC K˜D ⊑¬WingedHorse but
K S 6|HALC K˜D ⊑¬Faun
For the second statement, observe that there is an ALC model satisfying K S containing a Faun-element x, which is an
instance of K˜D and is not a Winged Horse, but is in the relation HasFriend with a WingedHorse-element y. Also, y is not
required to be an instance of K˜D . Hence, Faun is not exceptional with respect to K while WingedHorse is exceptional, and
we get rank(Faun)= 0 and rank(WingedHorse)=∞. Therefore, with this notion of exceptionality, T(Faun)⊑⊥ would not be
in the rational closure of TBox, as rank(Faun)≮ rank(Faun ⊓¬⊥), since, clearly, rank(Faun ⊓¬⊥)= rank(Faun).
The same example knowledge base K above can be used to show the difference between our notion of exceptionality in
Definition 19 and the notion of exceptionality in [7], which exploits the materialization of both the strict and the defeasible
part in the TBox. For simplicity, let us consider the case when ABox is empty and is not considered in the construction of
the rational closure of TBox. Following [7], we could define exceptionality as follows: “B is exceptional with respect to K if and
only if |HALC K˜ S ⊓ K˜D ⊑ ¬B”, where K˜ S = ⊓ {¬A ⊔ B | A ⊑ B ∈ K S } is the materialization of the strict inclusions in K and
K˜D is the materialization of the defeasible inclusions in K (as defined above). Consider the following example:
Example 10. Let K be the knowledge base in Example 9. We have K S = (¬Faun ⊔ ∃HasFriend.WingedHorse) and K˜D =
((¬WingedHorse⊔ Fly)⊓ (¬WingedHorse⊔¬Fly)). Therefore, 6|HALC K˜ S ⊓ K˜D ⊑¬Faun, i.e., Faun is not exceptional for K if we
adopt the notion of exceptionality from [7] and hence rank(Faun)= 0. Again, with this notion of exceptionality, T(Faun)⊑⊥
would not be in the rational closure of TBox, as rank(Faun)≮ rank(Faun ⊓ ¬⊥), while, as we have seen in Example 9, with
the notion of exceptionality in Definition 19 we get rank(Faun)=∞ and T(Faun)⊑⊥∈ TBox.
An alternative notion of exceptionality can be defined along the lines of [8]. Consider a knowledge base K = (TBox,ABox)
(again we assume ABox is empty). We can define exceptionality as follows: “B is exceptional with respect to K if and only if
K S ∪ KD |HALC ⊤⊑¬B”, where K S = {A ⊑ B | A ⊑ B ∈ TBox} is the set of strict inclusions in K and KD = {A ⊑ B | T(A)⊑
B ∈ TBox} is the set containing a strict inclusion for each defeasible inclusion in K . This notion of exceptionality is not
equivalent to the one in Definition 19 when used in the context of our rational closure construction, as shown by the
following example.
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Example 11. Let K = (TBox,ABox) where TBox= {Penguin⊑ Bird,Bird⊑ ∃HasEnemy.Penguin,T(Bird)⊑ Fly,T(Penguin)⊑¬Fly}
and ABox= ∅.
We have K S = {Penguin⊑ Bird,Bird⊑ ∃HasEnemy.Penguin} and KD = {Bird⊑ Fly,Penguin⊑¬Fly}.
It holds that: K S ∪ KD |HALC ⊤⊑¬Penguin and K S ∪ KD |HALC ⊤⊑¬Bird. For the first entailment, if M were an ALC
model satisfying the inclusions K S ∪ KD and x an instance of Penguin in M, then x would also be an instance of Bird and,
by the inclusions Bird⊑ Fly, Penguin⊑¬Fly in KD , x would be an instance of both Fly and ¬Fly. For the second entailment,
as there is no model satisfying K S ∪ KD that contains an instance of Penguin, then, there is no model containing an instance
of Bird, since any instance of Bird must be in the relation HasEnemy with an instance of Penguin.
Therefore, Penguin and Bird are both exceptional for K , so that rank(Bird) = ∞ and rank(Penguin) = ∞. Hence, with
this notion of exceptionality, T(Bird)⊑⊥ and T(Bird)⊑¬Fly would be in the rational closure of TBox. Conversely, with our
notion of exceptionality in Definition 19, we get that Bird is not exceptional for K , and that rank(Bird)= 0. Thus, T(Bird)⊑⊥
and T(Bird)⊑¬Fly are not in the rational closure of TBox (in agreement with the fact that these inclusions do not hold in
all the minimal models of K ).
In conclusion, if we replace, in our definition of rational closure (Definition 20), the notion of exceptionality in Defini-
tion 19 (based on the entailment in ALC + TR) with a different notion of exceptionality which exploits the materialization
of the KB and entailment in ALC , inspired to the notions of exceptionality used in [8,7], the rational closure we obtain is
different from the rational closure obtained based on exceptionality in Definition 19.
3.3. Rational closure over the ABox: maximizing the typicality of named individuals
In this section we extend the notion of rational closure defined in the previous one in order to take into account the
individual constants in the ABox. Consider, for instance, a K with TBox = {T(Bird) ⊑ Fly} and ABox = {Bird(tweety)}. We
would like to be able to conclude that Tweety flies although the ABox does not contain the information that Tweety is a
typical bird. The rational closure of the TBox, in the previous section, does not say anything about the individual constants in
the ABox, although its construction exploits the information in the ABox for consistency. We therefore address the question:
what does the rational closure of a knowledge base K allow to infer about a specific individual constant a occurring in the
ABox of K?
The definition of rational closure of a knowledge base K considered so far only exploits the ABox (and, in particular,
the typicality assertions T(C)(a) in the ABox) to determine the exceptionality of concepts and hence to build the sequence
TBox0,TBox1, . . . ,TBoxn of subsets of TBox required to define TBox, and to reason about concept inclusions. We address
the question of the ABox by first considering the semantic aspect, in order to treat individuals explicitly mentioned in
the ABox in a uniform way with respect to the other domain elements: as for all the domain elements we would like to
attribute to each individual constant named in the ABox the lowest possible rank. So we further refine Definition 25 by
taking into account the interpretation of individual constants of the ABox: given two minimal canonical models M and M′ ,
we will prefer M to M′ if there is an individual constant b occurring in ABox such that kM(b
I ) < kM(b
I ′ ) (whereas
kM(a
I )≤ kM(a
I ′ ) for all other individual constants occurring in ABox).
Definition 26 (Minimal canonical model of K minimally satisfying ABox). Given K = (TBox,ABox), let M= 〈1,<, I〉 and M′ =
〈1′,<′, I ′〉 be two canonical models of K which are minimal with respect to Definition 25. We say that M is preferred
to M′ with respect to ABox, and we write M <ABox M
′ , if, for all individual constants a occurring in ABox, it holds that
kM(a
I )≤ kM′ (a
I ′ ) and there is at least one individual constant b occurring in ABox such that kM(b
I ) < kM′ (b
I ′ ).
As a consequence of Theorem 7 we prove the following:
Theorem 10. For any K = (TBox,ABox) there exists a finite minimal canonical model of K minimally satisfying ABox.
Proof. Observe that, as a consequence of Theorem 7, a finite minimal canonical model M of K (with respect to TBox)
exists. In this model the rank of each element is finite (hence for each individual constant a, kM(a
I ) is finite). If M is not
minimally satisfying ABox, then there must be a canonical model M1 such that M1 <ABox M, i.e., such that: kM1 (a
I1 ) ≤
kM(a
I ) for all individual constants a of ABox, and for some individual constant b1 occurring in ABox kM1 (b
I1
1 ) < kM(b
I
1).
In turn, if M1 is not minimally satisfying ABox, there must be a canonical model M2 , such that M2 <ABox M1 , i.e., such
that: kM2 (a
I2 ) ≤ kM1 (a
I1 ) for all individual constants a of ABox, and for some individual constant b2 occurring in ABox
kM2 (b
I2
2 ) < kM1 (b
I1
2 ). And so on. Observe that the number of individual constants of ABox is finite, as well as the rank
associated to each constant in each model in the chain. Hence, any descending chain of models in the relation <ABox must
be finite, and a minimal canonical model minimally satisfying ABox exists. 2
In order to see the power of the above semantic notion, consider the standard birds and penguins example.
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Example 12. Suppose we have a knowledge base K where TBox = {T(Bird) ⊑ Fly,T(Penguin) ⊑ ¬Fly,Penguin ⊑ Bird}, and
ABox= {Penguin(pio),Bird(tweety)}. Knowing that tweety is a bird and pio is a penguin, we would like to be able to assume,
in the absence of other information, that tweety is a typical bird, whereas pio is a typical penguin, and therefore tweety
flies whereas pio does not. Consider any minimal canonical model M of K . Being canonical, M will contain, among other
elements, the following:
• x ∈ (Bird)I , x ∈ (Fly)I , x ∈ (¬Penguin)I , kM(x)= 0;
• y ∈ (Bird)I , y ∈ (¬Fly)I , y ∈ (¬Penguin)I , kM(y)= 1;
• z ∈ (Penguin)I , z ∈ (Bird)I , z ∈ (¬Fly)I , kM(z)= 1;
• w ∈ (Penguin)I , w ∈ (Bird)I , w ∈ (Fly)I , kM(w)= 2;
Notice that, in the definition of minimal canonical model, there is no constraint on the interpretation of the ABox constants
tweety and pio. As far as Definition 25 is concerned, for instance, tweety can be mapped onto x, that is to say tweetyI = x,
or onto y, i.e. tweetyI = y: the minimality of M with respect to Definition 25 is not affected by this choice. However in
the first case it would hold that tweety is a typical bird, in the second tweety is not a typical bird. We want to prefer the
first case, and this is what derives from Definition 26: if in M tweetyI = x whereas in M1 (which for the rest is identical
to M) it holds that tweetyI = y, then M is preferred to M1 . Similarly for pio. As a result, in all models of K , minimal with
respect to both TBox and ABox (Definition 26), it holds what we wanted: that tweety is a typical bird, i.e. T(Bird)(tweety),
and therefore it flies, whereas pio is a typical penguin, i.e. T(Penguin)(pio), and therefore it does not fly.
Our purpose is to give an algorithmic construction that we call rational closure of the ABox, which captures entailment
determined by minimal canonical models of the ABox. The idea is that of considering all the possible minimal consistent
assignments of ranks to the individuals explicitly named in the ABox. Each assignment adds some properties to named
individuals which can be used to infer new conclusions. We adopt a skeptical view of considering only those conclusions
which hold for all assignments. The equivalence with the semantics shows that the minimal entailment captures a skeptical
approach when reasoning about the ABox.
More formally, in order to calculate the rational closure of ABox, written ABox, for all individual constants of the ABox
we find which is the lowest possible rank they can have in minimal canonical models with respect to Definition 25: the
idea is that an individual constant ai can have a given rank k j(ai) just in case it is compatible with all the inclusions of
the TBox that do not contain the T operator or that have a T(C) on the left side with C ’s rank ≥ k j(ai) (the inclusions
whose antecedent C ’s rank is < k j(ai) do not matter since, in the minimal canonical model, there will be an instance of C
with rank < k j(ai) and therefore ai will not be a typical instance of C ). The minimal possible rank assignment k j for all ai
is computed in the algorithm below: µ
j
i computes all the concepts that ai would need to satisfy in case it had the rank
k j(ai). The algorithm verifies whether µ
j
i is compatible with (TBox,ABox) and whether it is minimal. Notice that, in this
phase, all constants are considered simultaneously (indeed, the possible ranks of different individual constants depend on
each other, as Example 14 below shows). For this reason, µ j (which is the union of all µ
j
i for all ai ) takes into account the
ranks attributed to all individual constants. Examples 13 and 14 below illustrate the use of the algorithm.
Definition 27 (ABox: rational closure of ABox). Let a1, . . . ,am be the individuals explicitly named in the ABox. Let k1,k2, . . . ,kh
be all the possible rank assignments (ranging from 1 to n, for n in Proposition 14) to the individuals occurring in ABox.
• Given a rank assignment k j we define:
– for each ai : µ
j
i = {(¬C ⊔ D)(ai) s.t. C, D ∈ S,T(C) ⊑ D in TBox, and k j(ai) = rank(C)} ∪ {(¬C ⊔ D)(ai) s.t. C ⊑
D in TBox};
– let µ j =µ
j
1 ∪ . . .∪µ
j
m for all µ
j
1 . . .µ
j
m just calculated for all a1, . . . ,am in the ABox
• We say that k j is consistent with (TBox,ABox) if:
– if T(C)(ai) ∈ ABox, then k j(ai)= rank(C);
– TBox∪ ABox ∪ µ j is consistent in ALC + TR;
• We say that k j is minimal and consistent with (TBox,ABox) if k j is consistent with (TBox,ABox) and there is no ki
consistent with (TBox,ABox) s.t. for all ai , ki(ai)≤ k j(ai) and for some b, ki(b) < k j(b).
• The rational closure of ABox (ABox) is the set of all assertions derivable in ALC + TR from TBox ∪ ABox ∪ µ
j for all
minimal consistent rank assignments k j , i.e.:
ABox=
⋂
k jminimal consistent
{C(a) : TBox∪ ABox∪ µ j |HALC+TR C(a)}
Before we provide soundness and completeness of the algorithm, let us illustrate its use by the two following examples.
The first example is the syntactic counterpart of the semantic Example 12 above.
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Example 13. Consider the standard penguin example. Let K = (TBox,ABox), where TBox = {T(Bird) ⊑ Fly,T(Penguin) ⊑
¬Fly,Penguin⊑ Bird}, and ABox= {Penguin(pio),Bird(tweety)}.
Computing the ranking of concepts we get that rank(Bird) = 0, rank(Penguin) = 1, rank(Bird ⊓ ¬Fly) = 1, rank(Penguin ⊓
Fly)= 2. It is easy to see that a rank assignment k0 with k0(pio)= 0 is inconsistent with K as µ
0 would contain (¬Penguin⊔
Bird)(pio), (¬Bird ⊔ Fly)(pio), (¬Penguin ⊔ ¬Fly)(pio) and Penguin(pio). Thus we are left with only two ranks k1 and k2 with
respectively k1(pio)= 1, k1(tweety)= 0 and k2(pio)= k2(tweety)= 1.
The set µ1 contains, among the others, (¬Penguin ⊔ ¬Fly)(pio), (¬Bird ⊔ Fly)(tweety). It is tedious but easy to check
that K ∪ µ1 is consistent and that k1 is the only minimal consistent assignment (being k1 preferred to k2), thus both
¬Fly(pio) and Fly(tweety) belong to ABox.
Example 14. This example shows the need of considering multiple ranks of individual constants: normally computer science
courses (CS) are taught only by academic members (A), whereas business courses (B) are taught only by consultants (C ),
consultants and academics are disjoint, this gives the following TBox: T(CS)⊑ ∀taught.A, T(B)⊑ ∀taught.C , C ⊑¬A. Suppose
the ABox contains: CS(c1), B(c2), taught(c1, joe), taught(c2, joe) and let K = (TBox,ABox). Computing the rational closure of
TBox, we get that all atomic concepts have rank 0. Any rank assignment ki , with ki(c1) = ki(c2) = 0, is inconsistent with
K since the respective µi will contain both (¬CS ⊔ ∀taught.A)(c1) and (¬B ⊔ ∀taught.C)(c2), from which both C(joe) and
A(joe) follow, which gives an inconsistency.
There are two minimal consistent ranks: k1 , such that k1(joe)= 0, k1(c1)= 0, k1(c2)= 1, and k2 , such that k2(joe)= 0,
k2(c1)= 1, k2(c2)= 0. We have that ABox ∪ µ1 |H A(joe) and ABox ∪ µ2 |H C(joe). According to the skeptical definition
of ABox, neither A(joe), nor C(joe) belongs to ABox, however (A ⊔ C)(joe) belongs to ABox.
We are now ready to show the completeness and soundness of the algorithm with respect to the semantic definition of
rational closure of ABox.
Theorem 11 (Completeness of ABox). Given K = (TBox,ABox), for all individual constants a in ABox, we have that if C(a) holds in all
minimal canonical models of K minimally satisfying ABox, then C(a) ∈ ABox.
Proof. We show the contrapositive. Suppose C(a) /∈ ABox, i.e. there is a minimal k j consistent with (TBox,ABox) s.t.
TBox∪ ABox∪µ j 6|HALC+TR C(a). This means that there is an M
′ = 〈1′,<′, I ′〉 such that for all ai ∈ ABox, kM′ (ai)= k j(ai),
M′ |HALC+TR TBox ∪ ABox ∪µ
j and M′ 6|HALC+TR C(a). We build a minimal canonical model M = 〈1,<, I〉 of K , mini-
mally satisfying ABox and such that C(a) does not hold in M as follows. Since we do not know whether M′ is minimal or
canonical, we cannot use it directly; rather, we only use it as a support to the construction of M. In particular we use it for
the following 11 component of M concerning the individuals explicitly named in ABox. Let 1=11 ∪12 where 11 = {ai :
ai in ABox} and 12 = {{C1, . . . ,Ck} ⊆ S : {C1, . . . ,Ck} is maximal consistent with K and T does not occur in {C1, . . . ,Ck}}.
Notice that 12 is necessary to make the model canonical. We define the rank kM of each domain element as follows:
for 11 , kM(ai)= k j(ai), and for 12 , kM({C1, . . . ,Ck})= rank(C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Ck). We then define < in the obvious way: x< y if
and only if kM(x) < kM(y).
We then define I as follows. First, for all ai in ABox we let a
I
i = ai . For the interpretation of concepts we reason in two
different ways for 11 and 12 . For 11 , we use M
′: for all atomic concepts C ′ , we let ai ∈ C
′ I in M if (ai)
I ′ ∈ C ′
I ′
in M′ .
For 12 , for all atomic concepts C
′ , we let {C1, . . . ,Ck} ∈ C
′ I if and only if C ′ ∈ {C1, . . . ,Ck}. I then extends to boolean
combinations of concepts in the usual way.
In order to conclude the model’s construction, for each role R , we define R I as follows. For ai,a j ∈11 , (ai,a j) ∈ R
I if
and only if ((ai)
I ′ , (a j)
I ′ ) ∈ R I
′
in M′ . For X, Y ∈12 , (X, Y ) ∈ R
I if and only if {C ′ : ∀R.C ′ ∈ X} ⊆ Y .
For ai ∈ 11 , X ∈ 12 , (ai, X) ∈ R
I if and only if there is an x ∈ 1′ of M′ such that (aI
′
i , x) ∈ R
I ′ in M′ and, for all
concepts C ′ , we have x ∈ C ′ I
′
if and only if X ∈ C ′ I .
I is extended to quantified concepts in the usual way.
By definition of R I and of I , it follows that for all X ∈12 , X ∈ ∀R.C
I iff ∀R.C ∈ X . Also, by maximality and consistency
of X , for all X ∈12 , X ∈ ∃R.C
I iff ∃R.C ∈ X , as can be easily verified. If X ∈ ∃R.C I , then by what just stated, ∀R.¬C /∈ X ,
and by maximality of X , ∃R.C ∈ X . For the other direction, if ∃R.C ∈ X then by consistency of X ∀R.¬C /∈ X , hence by what
just stated, X /∈ ∀R.¬C I , and therefore X ∈ ∃R.C I . For ai ∈11 , it obviously holds that ai ∈ ∀R.C
I iff ai ∈ ∀R.C
I ′ in M′ .
We first consider the TBox. M satisfies TBox: for elements ai ∈ 11 , for the inclusion Cl ⊑ C j ∈ TBox, if T does not
occur in Cl this obviously follows from definition of I since it holds in M
′ . For T(Cl)⊑ C j , for all ai we reason as follows.
First of all, if k j(ai) > rank(Cl) then ai /∈Min<(Cl
I ) and the inclusion trivially holds. On the other side, if k j(ai)= rank(Cl),
(¬Cl ⊔ C j)(ai) ∈ µ
j , and therefore (ai)
I ′ ∈ (¬Cl ⊔ C j)
I ′ in M′ , hence (ai)
I ∈ (¬Cl ⊔ C j)
I in M. Last, if k j(ai) < rank(Cl), by
Proposition 12 (for M′) then ai /∈ (Cl)
I , and we are done.
For the elements X ∈12: let Cl ⊑ C j ∈ TBox. If X /∈ (Cl)
I the property trivially holds. Let X ∈ (Cl)
I , i.e. Cl ∈ X . We show
that X ∈ (C j)
I . We consider two cases: either Cl is different from T(C
′) or Cl is T(C
′). Let us consider the first case. Suppose,
for a contradiction, that X /∈ (C j)
I and, hence, C j /∈ X . As X = {C1, . . . ,Ck} is consistent with K , K 6|HALC+TR C1⊓ . . .⊓Cn ⊑⊥.
As C j /∈ X and X is maximal among the consistent sets of concepts in S , K |HALC+TR C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn ⊓ C j ⊑ ⊥. Therefore,
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K |HALC+TR C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn ⊑ ¬C j . But, from the fact that Cl ⊑ C j ∈ TBox and Cl ∈ X , we get K |HALC+TR C1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ Cn ⊑ C j .
A contradiction. Let us consider the case that Cl is T(C
′). Since X ∈ (T(C ′))I also X ∈ C ′ I and by inductive hypothesis
C ′ ∈ X . We reason by contradiction: suppose C j /∈ X , hence ¬C j ∈ X . Since T(C
′) ⊑ C j ∈ TBox, it can be easily verified
that rank(C ′ ⊓ ¬C j) > rank(C
′). Consider an Y ∈ 12 s.t. C
′ ∈ Y and rank(Y ) = rank(C ′) (by Proposition 13 this Y exists).
Hence by definition of kM , kM(X) > kM(Y )= kM(C), which contradicts the possibility that X ∈Min(C
′)I , and hence that
X ∈ (T(C ′))I . Also in this case we can conclude that C j ∈ X . Notice that by what said above about quantified concepts, this
also holds in case C i or C j are quantified.
Furthermore, M is a minimal canonical model: it is canonical by construction. It is minimal with respect to Defini-
tion 23: for all X ∈12 , we have that kM(X) is the lowest possible rank it can have in any model (by Proposition 13).
We now consider the ABox. M satisfies ABox by definition of I and since M′ satisfies it. This is obvious for ABox
assertions that do not contain the T operator. If T(C)(ai) ∈ ABox, then by the algorithm k j(ai) = kM(ai) = rank(C). By
Proposition 13, and since M is minimal and canonical, we know that rank(C)= kM(C), therefore (ai)
I ∈Min<(C
I ) and M
satisfies T(C)(ai).
Last, M minimally satisfies ABox. This follows by minimality of k j . Suppose for a contradiction that there is another
canonical model M′ = 〈1′,<′, I ′〉 of K such that M′ <ABox M, for all ai kM′ (ai) ≤ kM(ai), and for at least one b,
kM′ (b) < kM(b). Consider k j′ , the rank assignment corresponding to M
′ (s.t. for all ai ∈ ABox, k j′ (ai)= kM′ (ai)
I ′ ). Clearly
k j′ threatens the minimality of k j . Furthermore M
′ |HALC+TR TBox ∪ ABox ∪ µ
j′ : it satisfies TBox ∪ ABox because it is
a model of K . It satisfies µ j
′
: for the inclusions without the T operator this is obvious. Let ai ∈ ABox, and let T(C) ⊑ D
with rank C ≥ k j′ (ai). It clearly holds that (ai)
I ′ ∈ (¬C ⊔ D)I
′
in M′: indeed if rank(C) > k j′ (ai), then by Proposition 13
(ai)
I ′ ∈ (¬C)I
′
. On the other hand, if rank(C)= k j′ (ai) always by Proposition 13, ai ∈min(C)
I ′ , and since by hypothesis M′
satisfies TBox, also ai ∈ (D)
I ′ . However, if all this holds, this contradicts the hypothesis that k j is a minimal consistent as-
signment. Therefore, TBox ∪ ABox ∪µ j
′
is consistent in ALC + TR , which contradicts the minimality of k j . It follows that
such M′ cannot exist, and therefore M minimally satisfies ABox.
Last, C(a) does not hold in M, since it does not hold in M′ .
We have then built a minimal canonical model of K minimally satisfying ABox in which C(a) does not hold. The theorem
follows by contraposition. 2
Theorem 12 (Soundness of ABox). Given K = (TBox,ABox), for each individual constant a in ABox, we have that if C(a) ∈ ABox then
C(a) holds in all minimal canonical models of K minimally satisfying ABox.
Proof. Let C(a) ∈ ABox, and suppose for a contradiction that there is a minimal canonical model M of K minimally
satisfying ABox s.t. C(a) does not hold in M. Consider now the rank assignment k j corresponding to M (such that
k j(ai) = kM(ai)). If T(C)(ai) ∈ ABox, then k j(ai) = kM(C) = rank(C) (by Proposition 13). k j is clearly minimal. Suppose
it was not so, and there was a k j′ such that for all ai k j′ (ai) ≤ k j(ai), and for some al , k j′ (al) < k j(al). By repeating the
same construction in the proof of Theorem 11, there is a minimal canonical model M′ of K minimally satisfying ABox
such that k j′ (ai) = kM′ (ai), therefore M
′ <ABox M, against the hypothesis of minimality of M. Clearly M |HALC+TR µ
j .
Indeed, for all ai let (¬C ⊔ D)(ai) ∈ µ
j
i . We distinguish two cases. If (¬C ⊔ D)(ai) has been introduced in µ
j
i because
of a C ⊑ D in TBox, clearly ai
I ∈ (¬C ⊔ D)I . If (¬C ⊔ D)(ai) has been introduced in µ
j
i because of a T(C) ⊑ D in TBox:
if ai
I ∈ (¬C)I clearly (¬C ⊔ D)(ai) holds in M. On the other hand, if ai
I ∈ (C)I : by hypothesis rank(C) = k j(ai) hence
by the correspondence between rank of a formula in the rational closure and in minimal canonical models (see Propo-
sition 13) also kM(C) = kM(ai
I ), but since ai
I ∈ (C)I , kM(C) = kM(ai
I ), therefore ai
I ∈ (T(C))I . By definition of µi , and
since by Theorem 8, M |HALC+TR TBox, D(ai) holds in M and therefore also ai
I ∈ (¬C ⊔ D)I . Furthermore by hypothesis
M |HALC+TR ABox.
Since by hypothesis M 6|HALC+TR C(a), it follows that TBox ∪ ABox ∪ µ
j 6|HALC+TR C(a), and by definition of ABox,
C(a) /∈ ABox, against the hypothesis.
The theorem follows by contraposition. 2
Let us conclude this section by estimating the complexity of computing the rational closure of the ABox:
Theorem 13 (Complexity of rational closure over the ABox). Given a knowledge base K = (TBox,ABox), an individual constant a and
a concept C , the problem of deciding whether C(a) ∈ ABox is ExpTime-complete.
Proof. Let |K | be the size of the knowledge base K and let the size of the query be O (|K |). As the number of inclusions in
the knowledge base is O (|K |), then the number n of non-increasing subsets E i in the construction of the rational closure is
O (|K |). Moreover, the number k of named individuals in the knowledge base is O (|K |). Hence, the number kn of different
rank assignments to individuals is such that both k and n are O (|K |). Observe that kn = 2Log k
n
= 2nLog k . Hence, kn is O (2nk),
with n and k linear in |K |, i.e., the number of different rank assignments is exponential in |K |.
To evaluate the complexity of the algorithm for computing the rational closure of the ABox, observe that:
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(i) For each j, the number of sets µ
j
i is k (which is linear in |K |). The number of inclusions in each µ
j
i is O (|K |
2), as
the size of S is O (|K |) and the number of T-inclusions T(C) ⊑ D ∈ TBox, with C, D ∈ S is O (|K |2), while the number of
T-inclusions C ⊑ D ∈ TBox is O (|K |). Hence, the size of set µ j is O (|K |3).
(ii) For each k j , the consistency with (TBox,ABox) can be verified by checking the consistency of TBox ∪ ABox ∪µ
j in
ALC + TR , which requires exponential time in the size of the set of formulas TBox∪ ABox∪µ
j (which, as we have seen, is
polynomial in the size of K ). Hence, the consistency of each k j can be verified in exponential time in the size of K .
(iii) The identification of the minimal assignments k j among the consistent ones requires the comparison of each consis-
tent assignment with each other (i.e. k2n comparisons), where each comparison between k j and k j′ requires k steps. Hence,
the identification of the minimal assignments requires k× k2n steps, i.e. a number of steps exponential in |K |.
(iv) To define the rational closure ABox of ABox, for each concept C occurring in K or in the query (there are O (|K |)
many concepts), and for each named individual ai , we have to check if C(ai) is derivable in ALC+TR from TBox∪ABox∪µ
j
for all minimal consistent rank assignments k j . As the number of different minimal consistent assignments k j is exponential
in |K |, this requires an exponential number of checks, each one requiring exponential time in the size of the knowledge
base |K |. The cost of the overall algorithm is therefore exponential in the size of the knowledge base. Completeness comes
from the complexity of the underlying ALC + TR , as stated in Theorem 5. 2
4. Conclusions and related works
In the first part of the paper we have provided a semantic reconstruction of the well known notion of propositional
rational closure. We have provided two minimal model semantics, based on the idea that preferred rational models are
those in which the rank of the worlds is minimized. We have then shown that when adding suitable possibility assumptions
to a knowledge base, these two minimal model semantics correspond to rational closure.
The correspondence between the proposed minimal model semantics and rational closure suggests the possibility of
defining variants of rational closure by varying the three ingredients underlying our approach, namely: (i) the properties of
the preference relation <: for instance just preorder, or multi-linear or weakly-connected; (ii) the comparison relation on
models: based for instance on the rank of the worlds or on the inclusion between the relations <, or on a special kind of
formulas satisfied by a world, as in the logic Pmin [19]; (iii) the choice between fixed or variable interpretations. The systems
obtained by various combinations of the three ingredients are largely unexplored and may give rise to useful nonmonotonic
logics.
In the second part of the paper we have defined a rational closure construction for the Description Logic ALC extended
with a typicality operator and provided a minimal model semantics for it based on the idea of minimizing the rank of
objects in the domain, that is their level of “untypicality”. This semantics corresponds to a natural extension to DLs of
Lehmann and Magidor’s notion of rational closure. We have also extended the notion of rational closure to the ABox, by
providing an algorithm for computing it that is sound and complete with respect to the minimal model semantics. Last,
we have shown an ExpTime upper bound for the algorithm. The work presented in this paper is an extension of the work
in [22] and in [24].
In another direction, we aim to develop a generalization of the notion of rational closure introduced in this paper and
of its minimal model semantics to deal with more expressive DLs and, in particular, with DLs which do not enjoy the finite
model property, such as ALCOIQ and SHOIQ, for which the notion of canonical model as introduced in this paper
appears to be too strong.
As far as rational closure is concerned, it is worth noticing that rational closure for Description Logics inherits both the
virtues and the weakness of propositional rational closure. We have already said about the strengths, among which there are
the good computational properties. For what concerns the weaknesses, rational closure does not allow to separately reason
about the inheritance of different properties. For instance, in the classical birds and penguins example, rational closure does
not allow to reason in this way: penguins inherit all typical properties of birds, except those for which we know they are
an exception (as the property of flying). On the contrary, once penguins are recognized as non-typical birds, no inheritance
of typical properties is possible. In order to solve this problem, a strengthening of a rational closure-like algorithm with
defeasible inheritance networks has been studied by [9].
In future work, we aim to explore possible strengthening of the notion of rational closure at the semantic level, to
overcome the weaknesses mentioned above. One possible direction we briefly discuss here, could be to “relativize” the
notion of typicality enforced by the semantics. In order to achieve this, we aim to refine the semantics by considering
models equipped with multiple preference relations, whence with multiple “typicality” operators. In this variant, it should be
possible to distinguish different aspects of typicality/exceptionality and consequently to avoid the “all or nothing” behavior
of rational closure with respect to property inheritance. For the time being, we just notice that in order to make this variant
interesting and meaningful, one should deal with issues like: what does differentiate one preference relation from another?
What are the dependencies between different preference relations? Can different preference relations or (syntactically)
different typicality operators be combined? All these issues require a suitable analysis/understanding which is preliminary
to the technical development. Furthermore, one should also study an algorithmic counterpart of this semantics, that is to
say, a suitable reformulation of the rational closure mechanism, with the hope of keeping a reasonable complexity.
In [23,21] nonmonotonic extensions of DLs based on the T operator have been proposed. In these extensions, the seman-
tics of T is based on preferential logic P. Nonmonotonic inference is obtained by restricting entailment to minimal models,
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where minimal models are those that minimize the truth of formulas of a special kind. In this work, we have presented
an alternative approach. First, the semantics underlying the T is R. Moreover and more importantly, we have adopted a
minimal model semantics, where, as a difference with the previous approach, the notion of minimal model is completely
independent from the language and is determined only by the relational structure of models.
Casini and Straccia in [8] develop a notion of rational closure for DLs. They propose a construction to compute the
rational closure of an ALC knowledge base, which is not directly based on Lehmann and Magidor definition of rational
closure [33], but is similar to the construction of rational closure proposed by Freund in [14] for the propositional calcu-
lus. [8] keeps the ABox into account, and defines closure operations over individuals. It introduces a consequence relation
 among a knowledge base K and assertions, under the requirement that the TBox is unfoldable and the ABox is closed
under completion rules, such as, for instance, that if a : ∃R.C ∈ ABox, then both aRb and b : C (for some individual con-
stant b) must belong to the ABox, too. Under such restrictions, a procedure is defined to compute the rational closure
of the ABox, assuming that the individuals explicitly named are linearly ordered, and different orders determine different
sets of consequences. The authors show that, for each order s, the consequence relation s is rational and can be com-
puted in PSpace. In a subsequent work [9,11], the authors introduce an approach based on the combination of rational
closure and Defeasible Inheritance Networks (INs). The authors first develop their approach at a propositional level, then they
extend it to DLs, addressing both TBox and ABox reasoning. The resulting construction is a nonmonotonic mechanism en-
joying the logical properties of rational entailment, but not suffering from the “all-or-nothing” behavior with respect to
inheritance of defeasible properties. The nonmonotonic mechanism proposed by the authors corresponds to an algorithm
to compute inferences, however, as a difference with our proposal, no declarative characterization of those inferences is
provided. To overcome the limitations of rational closure, in [10] Casini and Straccia also define a notion of lexicographic
closure for ALC .
In [7] a semantic characterization of a variant of the notion of rational closure introduced in [8] has been presented,
which is based on a generalization to ALC of our semantics in [22]. In [7], defeasible subsumption statements have the
form C <˜ D and typicality assertions are not allowed in the ABox, which is defined as a standard ALC ABox. As we haveseen, in this paper the presence of typicality assertions in the ABox may force some typicality inclusion not to hold, which
is similar to allowing negated conditionals in KLM logics. While the minimal model semantics naturally deals with the
presence of typicality assertions, the presence of typicality assertions in the ABox has to be taken into account, as we have
done, in the definition of rational closure of the TBox and of the ABox.
A further difference of our construction with those in [8,7] is in the notion of exceptionality: our definition of exception-
ality exploits preferential entailment, while [8,7] directly use entailment in ALC over a materialization of the knowledge
base. We have seen in Section 3.2 that we cannot replace entailment in ALC + TR by entailment in ALC over a materi-
alization of the knowledge base. However, when typicality assertions are not allowed in the ABox, our notion of rational
closure for TBox can be computed in ALC by defining a linear encoding of ALC + TR entailment into ALC (the encoding
is exactly the same as the one provided in [26] for encoding of SHIQRT entailment into SHIQ).
A related approach can be found in [3]. The basic idea of their semantics for the propositional case is similar to ours: to
consider models of the K where the rank of each world is as small as possible. This idea has its roots in the work by Pearl
[38] and by Lehmann and Magidor [33]. The construction of [3] differs from ours as the very notion of model is different
(although equivalent): a model is a sequence of sets of “atoms” (conjunctions of literals for every propositional variable).
Each set of the sequence represents a set of worlds with the same ranking. A unique model of the rational closure is then
defined by considering all models of the K and by taking for each level, starting from the bottom one, the union of the
worlds (not already considered) at that level. This construction corresponds to building a model where each world has a
minimal rank. In contrast, we proceed in a different way: our semantics is defined in terms of standard Kripke models
where the rank is given by the preference (or accessibility) relation, and models of the rational closure are defined as the
minimal ones with respect to a comparison relation on models. Our presentation is then more abstract and declarative
than the one proposed in [3], whilst theirs is more “operational”, as it relies on a specific representation of models and it
provides a recipe to build a model of the rational closure, rather than a characterization of its properties.
The logic ALC + TR we consider as our base language is equivalent to the logic for defeasible subsumptions in DLs
proposed by [5]. At a syntactic level the two logics differ, so that in [5] one finds the defeasible inclusions C <˜ D insteadof T(C)⊑ D of ALC + TR , however it has be shown in [20] that the logic of defeasible subsumption can be translated into
ALC + TR by replacing C <˜ D with T(C)⊑ D .In [6] the semantics of the logic of defeasible subsumptions is strengthened by a preferential semantics. Intuitively, given
a TBox, the authors first introduce a preference ordering ≪ on the class of all subsumption relations <˜ including TBox,then they define the rational closure of TBox as the most preferred relation <˜ with respect to ≪, i.e. such that there is noother relation <˜
′ such that TBox ⊆ <˜
′ and <˜
′ ≪ <˜. Furthermore, the authors describe an ExpTime algorithm in order tocompute the rational closure of a given TBox. [6] does not address the problem of dealing with the ABox. In [36] a plug-in
for the Protégé ontology editor implementing the mentioned algorithm for computing the rational closure for a TBox for
OWL ontologies is described.
Recent works discuss the combination of open and closed world reasoning in DLs. In particular, formalisms have been
defined for combining DLs with logic programming rules (see, for instance, [13] and [37]). A grounded circumscription
approach for DLs with local closed world capabilities has been defined in [32].
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Appendix A. An alternative semantics forALC + TR
An alternative semantic characterization of T can be given by means of a set of postulates that are essentially a refor-
mulation of axioms and rules of nonmonotonic entailment in rational logic R: in this respect, the T-assertion T(C) ⊑ D
is equivalent to the conditional assertion C |∼ D in R.5 Given a domain 1 and a valuation function I , one can define the
function fT(S) for S ⊆1 that selects the typical instances of S , and in case S = C
I for a concept C , it selects the typical
instances of C . In this semantics, we define (T(C))I = fT(C
I ), and fT has the intuitive properties for all subsets S of 1 of
Definition 28 below:
Definition 28 (Semantics of T with selection function). A model is any structure
〈1, fT, I〉
where:
• 1 is the domain;
• fT : Pow(1) 7−→ Pow(1) is a function satisfying the following properties (given S ⊆1):
( fT − 1) fT(S)⊆ S
( fT − 2) if S 6= ∅, then also fT(S) 6= ∅
( fT − 3) if fT(S)⊆ R , then fT(S)= fT(S ∩ R)
( fT − 4) fT(
⋃
S i)⊆
⋃
fT(S i)
( fT − 5)
⋂
fT(S i)⊆ fT(
⋃
S i)
( fT −R) if fT(S)∩ R 6= ∅, then fT(S ∩ R)⊆ fT(S)
• I is the extension function that maps each extended concept C to C I ⊆1, and each role R to R I ⊆1×1 as follows:
– I maps each role R ∈R to its extension R I ;
– I maps each atomic concept A ∈ C to its extension A I ;
– I is extended to complex concepts in the usual way for constructors in ALC , whereas for (T(C)) is as follows:
∗ (T(C))I = fT(C
I )
( fT − 1) enforces that typical elements of S belong to S . ( fT − 2) enforces that if there are elements in S , then there
are also typical such elements. ( fT − 3) expresses a weak form of monotonicity, namely cautious monotonicity. The next
properties constraint the behavior of fT with respect to ∩ and ∪ in such a way that they do not entail monotonicity. Last,
( fT − R) corresponds to rational monotonicity, and forces again a form of monotonicity: if there is a typical S having the
property R , then all typical S-and-Rs inherit the properties of typical Ss.
The following representation theorem shows that the above semantics for ALC+TR in Definition 28 is equivalent to the
one in Definition 13.
First of all, we need to recall Lemma 2.1 in [17]:
Lemma 1. (Lemma 2.1 in [17], page 5.) If fT satisfies ( fT − 1)− ( fT − 5), then fT(S ∪ R)∩ S ⊆ fT(S).
Now we are able to prove the representation theorem:
Theorem 14. A knowledge base is satisfiable in anALC + TR model described in Definition 13 if and only if it is satisfiable in a model
M= 〈1, fT, I〉 where fT satisfies ( fT − 1)− ( fT − 5) and ( fT −R), and (T(C))I = fT(C I ).
Proof. Here we only consider the property ( fT − R). For the other properties, we refer to the proof of the Representation
Theorem for ALC + T, as presented in [17], Theorem 2.1, page 5. The only if direction is trivial and left to the reader. For
the if direction, as in [17], we define the < relation as follows:
• for all x, y ∈1, we let x< y if ∀S ⊆1, if y ∈ fT(S), then (a) x /∈ S and (b) ∃R ⊆1 such that S ⊂ R and x ∈ fT(R).
5 This can be easily proven given Proposition 5.1 of [17] that shows the equivalence between the weaker logic ALC+ T in which fT satisfies ( fT − 1)−
( fT − 5) above but does not satisfy ( fT −R) and the KLM logic P which is weaker than R.
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Notice that given ( fT−R), this condition is equivalent to the simplified condition that only contains (a). Indeed, if (a) holds,
it follows that also (b) holds. To be convinced, take any S such that y ∈ fT(S), and x /∈ S . We show that x ∈ fT(S∪{x}), hence
(b) holds. For a contradiction, suppose x /∈ fT(S ∪ {x}), then by ( fT − 1) and ( fT − 2), fT(S ∪ {x}) ∩ S 6= ∅, and by ( fT − R),
fT(S)= fT((S ∪{x})∩ S)⊆ fT(S ∪{x}). Hence, y ∈ fT(S ∪{x}), which contradicts (a), given that x ∈ S ∪{x}. Therefore, we will
consider the simplified definition of <:
• for all x, y ∈1, we let x< y if ∀S ⊆1, if y ∈ fT(S), then x /∈ S .
We then show that if fT satisfies ( fT − R), then < is modular. Let x < y. Consider z and suppose z ≮ y. This means that
there is R such that y ∈ fT(R), and z ∈ R We reason as follows. First, notice that by Lemma 1, y ∈ fT({y, z}) (given that
y, z ∈ R , y ∈ fT(R ∪ {y, z}) ∩ {y, z}, hence y ∈ fT({y, z})). In order to show that < is modular, we want to show that x< z.
For a contradiction, suppose that x ≮ z. Then there is Z such that z ∈ fT(Z) and x ∈ Z . Consider Z ∪ {y, z}, by ( fT − 1),
fT(Z ∪ {y, z})⊆ Z ∪ {y, z}, and by ( fT − 2), fT(Z ∪ {y, z}) 6= ∅. Hence, either fT(Z ∪ {y, z})∩ Z 6= ∅ or fT(Z ∪ {y, z})∩ Z = ∅,
and fT(Z ∪{y, z})∩{y, z} 6= ∅. In the last case, y ∈ fT(Z ∪{y, z}). In the first case, by ( fT−R), fT(Z)= fT((Z ∪{y, z})∩ Z)⊆
fT(Z ∪ {y, z}), hence z ∈ fT(Z ∪ {y, z}). From this, we derive that fT(Z ∪ {y, z})∩ {y, z} 6= ∅, hence, by ( fT −R), fT({y, z})=
fT((Z ∪{y, z})∩{y, z})⊆ fT(Z ∪{y, z}), and y ∈ fT(Z ∪{y, z}). In both cases, we have that y ∈ fT(Z ∪{y, z}), however this is
impossible, given that x ∈ Z ∪ {y, z} and x< y. We therefore conclude that if z≮ y, then x< z, hence modularity holds. 2
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